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Abstract 
This study acknowledges the diversity between micro, small and medium-sized firms while predicting 
bankruptcy and financial distress of United States small and medium-sized enterprises. Empirical 
findings suggest that survival (failure) probability increases (decreases) with increasing firm size and 
firms in different size categories have varying determinants of bankruptcy, while factors affecting their 
financial distress are mostly invariant. Magnitude of significant covariates changes across the size 
categories of both bankrupt and financially distressed firms. Further, operating cash flow information 
does not add any marginal increment in prediction performance of multivariate hazard models above 
baseline models developed using information from income statements and balance sheets. This result 
holds for failure likelihood of SMEs as well as their respective size categories.  
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1. Introduction 
In developed economies, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are, relative to 
turnover, disproportionately linked to employment rates. In the United States (US), for 
instance, almost half of all employees work for enterprises with fewer than 250 employees. 
SMEs play a crucial role in the global economy, and are pivotal to the economic growth and 
development of a country (Bosma and Levie 2010), as well as to poverty reduction (Koshy and 
Prasad 2007). Therefore, a detailed understanding of the factors affecting SMEs survival is 
important for policy makers, firms and capital suppliers. The attention devoted to SMEs 
survival has constantly increased over the years, particularly after the financial crisis in 2008-
09. Indeed, the revised Basel capital accords and national governments have placed greater 
emphasis on understanding the credit risk attributes of SMEs. 
Notwithstanding the extensive literature on the performance and financial distress of 
SMEs, the factors and the extent to which they affect SMEs failure likelihood across size 
categories are still overlooked. As argued in a recent study by Altman et al. (2017), bankrupt 
and non-bankrupt firms have different boundaries due to their size (small and large), which 
affect the accuracy of prediction when data from one size category is used for another size 
category.  Building upon the previous evidence showing that size affects access to finance (e.g. 
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006), we propose a development in modelling financial distress and 
bankruptcy in the US. More specifically, we address this issue by exploring whether insolvency 
and financial distress likelihood varies across size categories of the US SMEs, by looking at 
the factors affecting SMEs failure likelihood in three sub-categories of SMEs (namely, micro, 
small, and medium1). Few studies explore the differences amongst the sub-categories of SMEs. 
Analysing financial and non-financial factors affecting UK SMEs bankruptcy across company 
size, Gupta et al. (2015) show that the credit risk characteristics of micro firms significantly 
differ from SMEs as a whole. Accordingly, they suggest that they should be treated separately 
                                                 
1 This paper classifies SMEs into three size categories (micro, small, and medium firms) as defined by the latest European 
Union classification. According to this classification, a firm is considered ‘micro’ if it has less than 10 employees with an 
annual turnover of less than €2 million (about $2.6 million); ‘small’ if it has less than 50 employees with an annual turnover 
of less than €10 million (about $13 million); and ‘medium’ if it has less than 250 employees with an annual turnover of less 
than €50 million (about $65 million). Further information can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-
environment/sme-definition/index_en.htm (accessed on July 28, 2015). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638485 
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for better pricing of credit risk and devising effective credit policies. In the light of this 
discussion, we expect the default characteristics to vary across SMEs size categories. We draw 
upon and advance this study by: i) using firms’ annual sales turnover, which is a preferred/more 
appropriate proxy of firms’ size than number of employees; ii) providing distinct evidence for 
two default definitions: bankruptcy (based on Chapter 7/11 filings), and financial distress 
(based on a firm’s ability to honour its financial commitments, and the value of its net worth); 
iii) exploring operating cash flow marginal discriminatory power across size categories; and, 
iv) examining the presence of statistically significant differences in the magnitude of mutually 
significant covariates in the model for all SMEs, and models for respective size categories, via 
the statistical (Wald) test of equivalence of coefficients. 
Based on our empirical analysis in the context of US SMEs, using annual firm level 
financial information obtained from the Compustat database (from 1990 to 2014), we conclude 
that all SMEs are not the same. More specifically, the determinants of bankruptcy vary across 
different size categories of SMEs. Earnings are only found to be important for the largest size 
category, as is also the case for the ratio of assets to liabilities. Financial expenses are almost 
always found to be significant, but the size of its effect varies, especially in reference to micro 
firms. We also present compelling evidence that estimated coefficients differ between models 
for financial distress estimated across SMEs as a whole, and the varying size categories. 
Forecasters would therefore be advised that distinct models for bankruptcy or financial distress 
should be specified not in reference to SMEs as a whole, but rather in consideration of the 
different size classifications. In contrast to the work by Gentry et al. (1987) and Gilbert et al. 
(1990), we do not find that cash-flow contributes to an understanding of bankruptcy. However, 
the results do compliment the findings of Charitou et al. (2004) for the UK in explaining 
financial distress using cash flow from operations (CFO). 
There are a number of differences in the estimated determinants of financial distress as 
opposed to bankruptcy. Firms with greater holdings of cash and short-term investments are less 
likely to face financial distress. Taxes are consistently found to have an effect on financial 
distress, but this is not the case for bankruptcy, where only the model across SMEs as a whole 
provides evidence of a significant effect. There is also evidence that the effect of the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities is different across different classes of firm when predicting 
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financial distress. The value of trade debt predicts financial distress, concordant with the 
findings of Hudson (1986) and Beck et al. (2006). It is possible that the value of trade credit is 
reduced as a firm appears more likely to file for bankruptcy, explaining the different result. 
Bankruptcy and financial distress are distinct events and separate modeling of them shall lead 
to improved risk pricing. A similar conclusion might be reached in reference to the 
consideration of different size categories of firms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review 
on bankruptcy prediction and survival analysis, which is the foundation for SMEs failure 
prediction analysis, and includes the potential effect of firm size and operating cash flow on 
SMEs likelihood of entering financial distress and bankruptcy. Section 3 outlines the empirical 
methods, including an explanation of the dataset and covariates. Results and discussion are 
reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
This section reviews the past studies on bankruptcy prediction and survival analysis and 
is the foundation for our SMEs failure prediction analysis. The discussion also includes the 
potential effect of firm size and operating cash flow on SMEs likelihood of entering financial 
distress and bankruptcy.      
2.1 Approaches to SMEs Failure Prediction  
The principal source of external funding for SMEs is debt and, more specifically, bank 
lending. However, lenders face problems in forecasting loan performance. This issue has been 
exacerbated over the years due to the presence of less favourable economic environments, 
particularly after the financial crisis in 2008-09. Such conditions also lead to restricted and 
over-priced credit. Credit risk incorrectly or inadequately measured can generate detrimental 
effects for SMEs, banks and the wider economy. Notwithstanding the importance of 
understanding and forecasting insolvency for SMEs, until the last decade, research in this area 
has been scant compared to the study on larger firms. This debate, to which the present paper 
aims to contribute, has mainly focused on improving banks’ estimation and treatment of credit 
risk for SMEs. 
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There is an extensive literature, spanning more than three decades, on business failure 
prediction (Balcaen and Ooghe 2006). This literature includes various credit risk models, which 
are mainly derived from two approaches: the Altman (1968) model, which uses accounting-
based indicators, and the Merton (1974) model, based on market information. Although the 
Merton (1974) model has significant advantages, the unavailability of market information in 
the case of unlisted companies deems it inapplicable for the majority of SMEs (e.g. Pompe and 
Bilderbeek 2005). Prediction of bankruptcy using accounting information began with the 
seminal work by Beaver (1966), who employed financial (accounting) ratios in an univariate 
model to predict failure. Shortly thereafter, the seminal multivariate (Z-score) model was 
developed by Altman (1968). Altman’s (1968) study concludes that traditional ratio analysis is 
not a reliable approach and should be replaced by multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA), 
as a more sophisticated tool for predicting default events. Following Altman (1968), a vast 
number of studies has applied the MDA statistical method to predict firms’ default. More 
recently, Altman et al. (2017) analysed the performance of the Z-score model in 31 European 
and 3 non-European countries. The authors argue that the Z-score model performs well in most 
countries, reaching a prediction accuracy of approximately 90% (when associated with 
additional country specific variables, or 75% otherwise). However, Ohlson (1980) challenged 
Altman’s (1968) Z-score model and raised some critical issues with the predictive efficiency 
of the MDA technique. To mitigate/overcome technical issues of previous models, Ohlson 
(1980) proposed logistic regression technique instead of MDA and thereafter it remains a 
popular choice (e.g. Altman and Sabato 2007, Gupta et al. 2014).  
Most bankruptcy prediction models are based on single period classification, with 
multiple period bankruptcy data. Given the fact that firms change through time, the bankruptcy 
probabilities produced by MDA or logistic models might be biased and inaccurate. Zavgren 
(1985) finds that in traditional default prediction models, the coefficients’ signs of the 
bankruptcy indicators may change in the years prior to failure. Luoma and Laitinen (1991) 
extend this claim by showing that not only the coefficients’ signs change before failure, but 
also the values of the coefficients. Evidence provided in these studies seems to suggest that 
traditional cross-sectional default prediction models are not valid, as the underlying failure 
process does not remain stable over time. Conversely, survival analysis models have the ability 
to address these changes, and hence are more suitable to modelling the dynamic process such 
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as bankruptcy prediction. However, Luoma and Laitinen (1991) conclude that the survival 
analysis approach slightly underperforms compared with discriminant analysis and logistic 
analysis in bankruptcy prediction. Laitinen and Kankaanpaa (1999) implemented a 
comparative study to test the performance of various bankruptcy prediction models. Their 
analysis indicates that hazard models have better predictive power for two and three-year 
predictions, while logistic analysis shows superior performance for one-year prediction. 
However, they conclude that the differences in models’ predictive powers are not statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, more recent studies shed light on the superior performance of the 
hazard models. Shumway's (2001) study was one of the first to employ a large sample of about 
2000 firms, spanning over 31 years. He found that half of the accounting variables used in 
previous models by Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984) are not significant indicators of 
bankruptcy likelihood. Moreover, the accuracy of the hazard model substantially increased 
when using both market-based and accounting-based indicators to predict business failures. 
Laitinen (2005) also found that the classification accuracy of the proportional hazard model in 
the years prior to the firms’ default is superior to other statistical models used by credit 
institutions. Employing the complete database of UK listed firms between 1979 and 2009, 
Bauer and Agarwal (2014) tested the performance of two hazard models (Shumway 2001, 
Campbell et al. 2008) against the traditional accounting-based Z-score model (Taffler 1983) 
and Merton’s contingent claims-based model (Bharath and Shumway 2008). They report clear 
evidence regarding the mis-calibration of the Z-score model and contingent-claim based model, 
while the average default probabilities of hazard models are closer to observed default rates. 
They also find that the Z-score model and contingent claim-based approach clearly 
underperform, while the receiving operator characteristics (ROC) analysis highlights no 
significant differences between the two hazard models. 
The use of qualitative information presented a further development in modelling firms’ 
credit risk (e.g. Lehmann 2003). Analogously, Grunert et al. (2005) and Tsai et al. (2009) report 
that non-financial factors present a useful supplement to financial factors in credit rating. In 
the context of SMEs, Altman et al. (2010) report improvement in models’ classification 
performance after accounting for qualitative information of UK SMEs. 
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Until recently, less academic attention has been devoted to SMEs in the failure prediction 
literature. This calls for scholarly contributions for a deeper understanding of the factors and 
their magnitude in affecting SMEs failure likelihood. Previous studies show that the use of 
annual report variables two years and one year before failure improves the predictive power of 
financial variables, while annual report variables do not contain incremental information three 
years before failure (Laitinen 1993). In an analysis of SMEs in the US, Altman and Sabato 
(2007) use financial measures to develop default prediction models using logistic regression, 
reporting a significant improvement over standard credit scoring models. They conclude that 
banks’ capital requirements should be (slightly) lower if SMEs are treated as a distinct 
corporate category. However, the introduction of non-financial information - missing in their 
study - has been seen by the authors themselves as a necessary future line of investigation. The 
relevance of the addition of non-financial information in improving model performance has 
been confirmed by Altman et al.'s (2010) approach in an analysis of UK SMEs.  
2.2 SMEs and Size Factor 
 The strength of old-large firms often represents the weakness of new-small firms and 
vice-versa (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). The liabilities of smallness create various problems, 
such as: competing for labour, meeting government requirements, innovation performance, and 
raising capital. These issues lead to their high mortality rate. Indeed, as the number of 
employees increases, companies adopt different formal human resource practices (e.g. Kotey 
and Slade 2005), organisational structures, and innovation strategy. In particular, exploring 
innovation within different SMEs size categories, De Mel et al. (2009) find that more than one 
quarter of micro firms engage in innovation, with marketing innovation being the most 
common. The authors show that firm size exhibits a stronger positive effect on process and 
organisational innovations than on product innovations. 
Size has a strong direct impact on the financial and economic performance of SMEs. 
Literature has reported on heterogeneity in the characteristics of firms, their access to finance 
and, in turn, the company’s potential for growth. The smaller the size the more firms’ growth 
is constrained by: i) corruption of bank officials; ii) financial and legal issues (Beck et al. 2005); 
and iii) obstacles to accessing external finance (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006), especially if 
the firm is young (Beck et al. 2006). Leverage decisions (Ramalho and Da Silva 2009) and 
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capital structure choices also vary significantly between micro, small and medium-sized firms. 
Investigating capital structure choices, Mateev et al. (2013) find that medium-sized firms are 
mainly dependant on long term bank loans as their preferred method of external financing, 
while short-term loans and trade credits are the main sources of external finance for micro and 
small businesses. Holmes et al. (2010) estimate hazard functions separately for micro-
enterprise and SMEs and find that the effect of variables on the survival of these two types of 
firms is substantially different. The empirical literature also argues that the stability of cash 
flow and diversity increases with firm size (Gill et al. 2009), leading to a negative relationship 
between firm size and default likelihood (Pettit and Singer 1985). The relationship between 
SMEs asset size and insolvency risk is not linear, when controlling for company size using 
total asset value (Altman et al. 2010). This is mainly due to creditors being less likely to force 
companies with low asset value into insolvency, as they do not benefit from the recovery 
process. After a certain threshold, the insolvency risk ultimately declines with company size, 
as shown in the study by Gupta et al. (2015), in which the authors demonstrate that risk and 
default characteristics of ‘micro’ firms differ from those of larger SMEs size classifications. 
Notwithstanding the effort spent in assessing a firm’s financial situation, it would appear that 
there is room in the literature (e.g. Gupta et al. 2018) for approaches to directly identify factors 
affecting both financial distress and bankruptcy across different size categories of SMEs. A 
more comprehensive picture of the factors affecting SMEs failure could help companies, 
financial institutions, and policy makers to make better informed choices. On this backdrop, 
we test the following three hypotheses:  
 
H1: Failure rate of SMEs varies across micro, small and medium size 
categories. 
H2: Factors affecting SMEs failure likelihood vary across micro, small and 
medium size categories. 
H3: Factors that are mutually significant in predicting failure likelihood of 
SMEs, and micro, small or medium firms respectively, exhibit significant 
differences in the magnitude of their coefficient in respective models.  
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2.3 Cash Flow from Operation and SMEs failure  
In this paper, CFO is also introduced as an augmentation to the existing empirical work 
on the US SMEs. Building upon previous studies, CFO has been acknowledged as a factor in 
explaining SMEs bankruptcy (Gentry et al. 1987, Gilbert et al. 1990) as well as financial 
distress (Charitou et al. 2004). Literature on trade credit and capital structure of small firms 
has shown that firms with insufficient cash flow are more susceptible to financial distress. 
Casey and Bartczak (1984) find that the accrual-based MDA model has superior predictive 
power than any single operating cash flow ratio. Traditional cash flow may be a more reliable 
predictor of failure compared to operating cash flow (Laitinen 1994) but operating cash flow 
seems to be more sensitive to recession, as it declines in non-failed firms when other firms are 
approaching the failure date. As CFO relates directly to the liquidity position of the firm, its 
inclusion provides an indication of a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations. 
Accordingly, stakeholders value the interrogation of cash flow variables as they embed 
information on the potential “early  warning”  of  financial difficulties (Mossman et al. 1998). 
In studies that do not explicitly model SMEs, there are mixed findings on the impact of 
CFO on failure. Turetsky and McEwen (2001) model financial distress rather than bankruptcy, 
making explicit reference to cash-flow. Conversely, Bernard and Stober (1989) do not consider 
CFO to be useful in forming expectations on future cash-flows, arguing that the figures are too 
easy for managers to manipulate. This may assist in explaining why Mazouz et al. (2012) did 
not find CFO to be useful in predicting default. Additionally, analysing UK SMEs, Gupta et 
al. (2014) report that operating cash-flow2 information does not contribute to an improved 
understanding of SMEs failure likelihood. Preceding studies have examined the effects of CFO 
in the context of larger firms only or in different institutional-economic environments (Gupta 
et al. 2014). In moving to an examination of smaller firms, we might pose this question again 
in the US context. SMEs are less able to manipulate accruals; this could determine less 
measurement error or bias for smaller firms. This might also commend the analysis of SMEs 
by size class, as micro firms in particular may have less control over the reporting of CFO. In 
light of this discussion, we test the following hypothesis: 
  
                                                 
2 This provides a useful picture of the cash holdings of a firm for use in insolvency studies as it is not conflated 
with factors such as depreciation. 
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H4: Marginal information content of CFO information above income 
statement and balance sheet is significant in predicting failure likelihood 
of SMEs and their respective size categories.  
3. EMPIRICAL METHODS 
This section provides discussion pertaining to the source and use of dataset, selection of 
explanatory variables as well as statistical model employed in this study. 
3.1 Dataset 
We employ annual firm-level data from the Compustat database. A relatively long 
sample period is employed, running from 1990 through 2014 inclusive, although note should 
be taken that the specified model seeks to predict bankruptcy or financial distress in the 
following year. SMEs are defined as firms having annual sales turnover less than $65 million 
(or €50 million), broadly consistent with the definition adopted by the European Union. The 
United States formally defines an SME as having fewer than 500 employees, although there is 
a debate as to whether employee numbers are the most appropriate definition. The definition 
adopted here better facilitates comparison with previous works discussed above. One of the 
contributions of this work is the investigation of insolvency hazard across size categories of 
SMEs. This naturally requires a determination of size category. In this, we are guided by the 
European Union’s definition of micro, small and medium firms. Micro firms are defined as 
those with sales of less than $2.6 million, small firms are those with sales above this but less 
than $13 million, and medium firms being the remainder, with sales of less than $65 million.  
Financial distress and exit are different events as well. As discussed by Keasey et al. 
(2014) in a study of UK firms, exit may occur for reasons other than financial distress, or in 
anticipation of future distress. However, the greater economic costs and a greater concern for 
banks is where the restructuring or exit of a firm is less ordered or involuntary. In common 
with Keasey et al. (2014) the focus of part of the analysis presented here is the prediction of 
whether a firm will be in financial distress, rather than a prediction of exit for all possible 
reasons. Thus, following Keasey et al.'s (2014) definition of financial distress, we consider a 
firm as financially distressed if: i) its EBITDA (earnings before interest tax depreciation and 
amortization) is less than its financial expenses for two consecutive years; and ii) the net worth/total 
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debt is less than one and the net worth experienced negative growth between the two periods. 
Additionally, a firm is also recorded as financially distressed in the year immediately following 
these distress events. 
We further analyse the determinants of exit as a consequence of legal bankruptcy. In the 
US, a firm may either be liquidated (Chapter 7) or enter bankruptcy proceedings for the 
purposes of financial restructuring (Chapter 11). In the case of a Chapter 11 filing, the firm 
may remain in a bankrupt state for a period of time and re-enter, possibly several times, 
following emergence. Data on bankruptcy filings is available from Compustat. In Compustat, 
a company has status alert indicator (data item “stalt”) "TL" when it is in bankruptcy. 
Generally, a company will have a "TL" indicator for the quarter/year in which it files for 
Chapter 11 or Chapter 7, and it remains "TL" in subsequent the quarter/year until it emerges 
from Chapter 11 or is liquidated. A further “AG” footnote on total assets appears during the 
quarter/year the company emerges from Chapter 11. Consequently, taking the bankruptcy filing 
date as the bankruptcy indicator ignores the possible subsequent bankruptcy states. Thus, our 
definition considers a firm to be bankrupt when its status alert is “TL” and healthy otherwise. 
This classification is consistent with the basic notion of survival analysis, in which a subject 
may remain in a given risky state for more than one-time period. For ease of exposition (and 
in want of a better term), the proceeding discussion of explanatory variables collects these two 
legal default events under the term ‘bankruptcy’, without any distinctions being drawn between 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 filings.  
As the age of a firm might be expected to influence the probability of entering bankruptcy 
or financial distress, we consider the age of firms in our empirical analysis. Age is proxied by 
the earliest year for which financial information is available in the Compustat database. In 
Compustat, 1950 is the earliest point in time for which financial information is available. In 
order to avoid measurement error, we selected only those firms that entered the Compustat 
database after 1950. Further, financial firms (with Standard Industrial Classification – SIC 
codes from 6,000 through 6,999) and regulated utilities (codes 4,900 through 4,949) have been 
excluded from our analysis. This is a common approach in the literature, as financial firms are 
likely to have very different capital structures and regulated industries may be constrained such 
that a reliable model of behaviour is more difficult to obtain. Some firms might have multiple 
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entry and exits in our database. For instance, when an existing SME reports sales revenue over 
$65 million, it exits our sample and returns only when its sales revenue drops below $65 
million. The age variable is therefore created before applying other filters. We also excluded 
subsidiary firms (if the ‘stock ownership’ code - Compustat data item ‘stko’) is ‘1’ (subsidiary of 
a publicly traded company) or ‘2’ (subsidiary of a company that is not publicly traded) in the 
Compustat database. 
3.2 Explanatory Variables 
A large number of explanatory variables are discussed in the academic literature on firm 
default, financial distress and insolvency. We follow this literature in collating variables and 
conducting a number of first stage tests for their (joint) inclusion in the determination of 
financial distress or bankruptcy (see for example Altman and Sabato 2007, or Lin et al. 2012). 
This will be discussed further below, following a description of the explanatory variables and 
the reasons for their consideration in the modelling process. The variables included in the 
model are listed in Table 13.  
Liquid assets might be drawn upon by a firm to meet immediate payments. Therefore, 
we expect that a firm with lower cash and short-term investments relative to total assets (CTA) 
will have a higher probability of default. A parallel argument might be made in relation to the 
scale of trade creditors to total assets (TCTA), with a larger value signifying greater immediate 
short-term claims on the firm and, therefore, a greater probability of default.  Hudson (1986) 
reports that trade creditors are an important component of short term liabilities for many SMEs, 
and we might therefore expect this variable to have an effect on the probability of default. A 
further measure of the liquidity position of the firm is the log of current assets to current 
liabilities (LCR), where a higher value is expected to have a negative effect on the probability 
of default. A higher income tax paid in relation to total assets (TTA) is expected to have a 
negative effect on the probability of default, as firms having higher income are expected to pay 
higher taxes. The level of short term debt relative to equity book value (STDEBV) is also 
included as a measure proxying the short-term claims on the firm relative to capital employed. 
Short-term debt must be refinanced or repaid more immediately than is the case for other 
                                                 
3 While calculating respective financial ratios, we replace denominators having value 0 with small positive values 
of $1 to ensure that ratios of respective firm-year observations does not produce any missing value. 
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sources of financing, and may be critical to the (involuntary) default of the firm if it is large. 
We take the capital employed divided by total liabilities (CETL) as an (inverse) measure of 
leverage. The larger the capital of the firm relative to the liabilities, the lower the expected 
default probability. Capital growth (CAG) is included as a higher rate of growth might indicate 
a growing capacity to meet financial obligations or to finance futures operations. This would 
suggest a lower probability of default. Total liabilities to total assets (TLTA) is also included 
as an explanatory variable, again as a measure of the financial fragility of the firm. Tangible 
assets are often found to be important in the determination of both capital structure and default. 
Ceteris paribus a company with a higher level of tangible assets is more likely to obtain 
external funding and to be offered re-financing in the event of difficulties. Further, Jones (2011) 
argues that firms in financial distress are more likely to capitalise intangible assets. We 
therefore include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (IATA) as a predictor of default. 
We employ a number of measures linked to earnings. The first of these is retained 
earnings relative to total assets (RETA). If a firm is nearing default, then we expect that this 
will be reflected in lower retained earnings. Conversely, even where the liquidity of the firm is 
under pressure, we would expect that a firm with relatively high retained earnings would find 
(re)financing easier and hence the probability of default lower. As we might expect earnings to 
be an important predictor of default, this is further explored through the inclusion of earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, again relative to total assets (EBITDATA). 
There is relatively little choice on the part of the firm in the determination of the value of this 
variable, the inclusion of which may therefore compliment the inclusion of RETA, where 
greater choice on the part of the firm’s managers may be evident. We also include financial 
ratios related to financial expense. Financial expenses relative to total assets (FETA) is 
included as a means to proxy the financial claims on the company, with a larger size of this 
variable expected to increase the probability of default. A similar argument holds for the 
financial expenses relative to cash flow from operations (FECFO). 
An innovation in the analysis of default in US SMEs is the inclusion of variables related 
to cash flow from operations (henceforth CFO). We include a measure for cash-flow divided 
by total assets (CFOTA), with a high value suggesting a better asset utilization and hence lower 
default risk. Where current liabilities are used as the denominator, the resultant variable 
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CFOCL is presented as a proxy for the ability of the firm to meet its obligations from CFO. 
With sales as the denominator we have the variable CFOS, a proxy for how effectively the firm 
manages its receipts/payments. We further include the growth in CFO (CFOG) as an indicator 
that the firm’s short term financial position and, hence, ability to meet its obligations will be 
improving with higher values of CFOG. The lower the rate at which earnings are translated to 
cash-flows, the worse, relatively speaking, the liquidity position of the firm. As we expect 
liquidity (rather than earnings) to influence default, we therefore anticipate that higher values 
of ECFO (earnings divided by operating cash-flows) lower the probability of default. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.3 Hazard Model 
3.3.1 Basic Hazard Model 
The analysis of default is derived from a survival function. Survival analysis addresses 
the time to the occurrence of an event, which in this study is the time until a default, being 
either a bankruptcy or financial distress. Suppose T is a non-negative random variable that 
denotes the time of a default event and t represents time itself. T then has a probability density 
function 𝑓(𝑡) or a cumulative distribution function (CDF) such that 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr⁡(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡). A 
survival function, 𝑆(𝑡) is then given by the probability that 𝑇 > 𝑡, the reverse CDF of T. 
𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇 > 𝑡)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
At 𝑡 = 0, the survivor function is equal to one and moves toward zero as 𝑡 approaches infinity. 
The relationship between the survivor function and hazard function ℎ(𝑡) (also known as the 
conditional failure rate at the time⁡𝑡) is mathematically defined as follows: 
ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
Pr⁡(𝑡 + ∆𝑡 > 𝑇 > 𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡)
∆𝑡
=
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
=
−𝑑⁡ln𝑆(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2) 
The hazard rate is the (limiting) probability that the failure event occurs within a given time 
interval, given that the subject has survived to the start of the interval, divided by width of the 
interval. The hazard rate must be non-negative and varies from zero to infinity and may be 
increasing, decreasing, or constant over time. A hazard rate of zero signifies no risk of failure 
at that instant, while infinity signifies certainty of failure at that instant.   
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3.3.2 Discrete-Time Hazard Model 
Some events may be experienced at any instant in continuous-time. This results in exact 
censoring and survival times, which will be recorded in relatively fine time scales such as 
seconds, hours or days. If there are no tied survival time periods, then under such circumstances 
a continuous-time survival model is an appropriate choice (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012).  
However, in many cases the events are discrete or recorded at discrete intervals; for instance, 
expressing time to event in weeks, months or years. Where there are relatively few censoring 
or survival times with tied survival time periods, then a discrete-time survival model is more 
appropriate (again see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Interval-censoring4 leads to discrete-
time data, which is the case with our database. Here, the beginning and end of each time interval 
is the same for all of the SMEs, as the information is recorded on an annual basis. Thus, the 
event of interest may take place at any time within the year but it cannot be known until the 
information is provided at the end of the year. Hence, considering the discussion above, we 
estimate our hazard models in a discrete-time framework with random effects (𝛼𝑖), controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity or shared frailty. 
The discrete-time representation of the continuous-time proportional hazard model with 
time-varying covariates leads to a generalized linear model with complementary log-log link 
(Grilli 2005, Jenkins 2005, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012), specified as follows: 
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔(ℎ𝑖(𝑡)) ≡ 𝑙𝑛{− 𝑙𝑛(1 − ℎ𝑖(𝑡))} = 𝛽𝑥(𝑡)𝑖
′ + 𝜆𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(3)⁡   
Here, 𝜆𝑡 is time-specific constant which is estimated freely for each time period t, thus making 
no assumption about the baseline hazard function within the specified time interval. However, 
in most empirical studies logit link is used over complementary log-log (clog-log) link as 
specified in equation 4. 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑒𝛼(𝑡)+⁡𝑥(𝑡)𝑖
′𝛽
1 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡)+⁡𝑥(𝑡)𝑖
′𝛽
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(4) 
                                                 
4 The event is experienced in continuous-time but we only record the time interval within which the event takes 
place. 
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Where ⁡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the probability of experiencing the event by subject i at time t and α(t) captures 
the baseline hazard rate. This will produce very similar results as long as the time intervals are 
small (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) and the sample bad rate (% of default to non-default) 
is very low (Jenkins 2005). Thus, considering this discussion, we estimate our discrete hazard 
models using a logit link estimator. 
3.3.3 Specifying Baseline Hazard rate 
The baseline hazard rate is a necessary stage of analysis for the discrete hazard model. 
The specification of the baseline hazard function defines the probability of default given 
baseline values for the explanatory variables. Here we set all baseline values equal to zero. 
Time-varying variables are then identified that bear a functional relationship with survival 
times. 
There are a number of alternate specifications for the baseline hazard function including 
log(survival time), polynomial in survival time, fully non-parametric, and piece-wise constant 
(see Jenkins 2005). For a fully non-parametric baseline hazard function, duration-interval-
specific dummy variables need to be created (see Beck et al. 1998). However, this method 
becomes cumbersome if the maximum survival time in the dataset is very high, as in case of 
bankruptcy databases. A more parsimonious way of specifying the baseline hazard function is 
to use a piece-wise constant method. In this, the survival times are split into different time 
intervals that are assumed to exhibit a constant hazard rate (see Jenkins 2005). If there are time 
intervals (dummies) with no events, then the relevant observations from the estimation should 
be dropped as duration specific hazard rates cannot be estimated for them (Jenkins 2005, Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Considering the estimation convenience, the piece-wise constant 
specification of baseline hazard rate could be applied. However, if the hazard curve shows 
frequent and continuous steep rises and falls, then the piecewise approach may not be used and 
the fully non-parametric baseline hazard might be an appropriate choice. 
3.4 Model Validation using ROC Curves 
To evaluate the classification performance of the default prediction models developed, 
we present measures of their predictive accuracy. Out-of-sample validation regression models 
are first estimated up to 2010, with predictions made for bankruptcy and financial distress in 
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2011. The estimation period is then updated for a further year, ending in 2011, again with 
predictions made for the following year, with the updating process continuing until the final 
prediction year of 2014. 
Model predictive performance is reported using Receiving Operator Characteristics 
(ROC) curves. These plot the true positives, where the model predicted a default which actually 
occurred, also known as sensitivity, on the ordinate axis. The false positives are plotted on the 
abscissa axis, where the firm defaults but the model failed to predict this, also known as fall 
out or (1-specificity). These are plotted because the discrimination threshold between defaulted 
and non-defaulted firms is varied. A 45o line would indicate no discriminatory power in the 
model; accordingly, deviations (above this) might be taken as an indication of 
predictive/discriminatory success. Therefore, the area under the ROC (AUROC) might be 
measured to provide a numerical value of model performance. Its value ranges from 0.5 to 1.0, 
which encapsulates the classification performance of the model developed. AUROC of 1 
denotes a model with perfect prediction accuracy and 0.5 suggest no discrimination ability. In 
general there is no ‘golden rule’ regarding the value of AUROC, however anything between 
0.7 and 0.8 is acceptable, while above 0.8 is considered to be excellent (Hosmer Jr et al. 2013). 
4. Results and Discussion 
To eliminate the influence of extreme outliers on our statistical estimates, we restrict the 
range of all our financial ratios between the 5th and 95th percentiles. In addition, we lag all our 
variables by one-year to ensure that all information employed in prediction is available at the 
beginning of each year. Note that default is recorded during the year in which it takes place to 
ensure that fitted values for the dependent are not based on financial information presented in 
the same year, as some information would post date the default event. 
4.1 Failure Rate and Descriptive Statistics 
Information on the sample for the dependent variables is presented in Table 2, 
disaggregated by SMEs size classification and failure type (bankrupt and financially distressed 
firms). 
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Notwithstanding the number of SMEs filing for bankruptcy is small in absolute terms, 
bankruptcy aggregated data delineates an apparent decline in incidence over the time window 
analysed (especially after around 2001). Data seems to suggest different trends when 
bankruptcy is disaggregated by SMEs size categories. Indeed, the ‘micro firm’ set represents 
the largest single component of the total (with only a few exceptions). In particular, this 
tendency is confirmed in this century. The same might also be said for firms that are financially 
distressed. Indeed, micro firms are always the largest group of financially distressed firms and 
their relative importance is growing over time, especially during this century (in line with the 
bankruptcy trend). Distress rates for this group have been above 40% for much of the time 
since the dotcom bubble in 2002. Although cohort sizes may vary, these simple descriptive 
statistics reinforce the interest in examining the determinants of default events separately. This 
evidence provides strong support for our hypothesis H1. Default numbers and proportions do 
not appear to be consistent across the different size classifications of SMEs, whether firms are 
filing for legal bankruptcy or entering financial distress. Note might also be taken of the very 
large number of firms that are facing financial distress, and the challenges and importance of 
predicting distress for external providers of capital. Further details on sample description and 
descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables can be found in Appendix A5. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
4.2 Analysis of Survival and Hazard Curves 
As discussed earlier, it appears that the likelihood of default changes over time and, 
consequently, a simple statistical test (such as a t test) may be misleading. In the context of 
survival analysis, many of the alternative measures were specifically developed for continuous-
time models and may also suffer from bias when applied in a discrete-time framework.  
Consequently, we estimate univariate hazard models and report average marginal effects 
(AME) for each variable to facilitate the specification of the later multivariate model. The usual 
marginal effects report on the change in the conditional mean default in the baseline model as 
a consequence of a marginal change in one of the explanatory variables6. However, this paper 
                                                 
5 Table A1 reports descriptive statistics outlining any potential discriminatory power of a set of explanatory 
variables, according to their type of failure (bankruptcy vs financial distress). 
6 Note that none of the variables in question is a dummy variable. 
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first estimates a marginal effect for each observation and, then, the average across the marginal 
effects to obtain AME. The absolute values of the AME are ranked, as a guide to later model 
specification, and their statistical significance is reported. In case the variables for the SME 
category are statistically significant, we reported the p-value for a Wald test of the equivalence 
of the estimated coefficient for each of the size categories. The rationale behind this analysis 
is two-fold: first, it provides early evidence of whether the determinants of default are similar 
across different categories of SMEs; and second, it informs the proceeding model specification. 
Figure 1 presents survival and hazard curves for our sample of micro, small and medium 
firms. These show the hazard of bankruptcy and financial distress for the different size classes 
of SMEs. Reflecting on the discussion of the previous section, the hazard rates for bankruptcy 
are lower than for financial distress; conversely, the survival rates are higher for bankrupt firms 
in comparison to firms experiencing financial distress. This reinforces our argument that, at a 
given age, the likelihood of financial distress is much higher and significantly different from 
bankruptcy likelihood. The top part of Figure 1 presents survival curves for the bankrupt and 
distressed groups of firms for different SMEs size categories. From these graphs, it emerges 
clearly that survival rates with respect to firms’ age vary with firms’ size. Larger firms tend to 
have better survival rates than smaller firms. In particular, for the bankrupt group of firms, the 
survival rate of micro firms is significantly lower (conversely hazard curves are significantly 
higher) than small and medium-sized firms. Although the survival curve of small firms is lower 
than that of medium firms, they are very close to each other throughout. This suggests that both 
small and medium-sized firms exhibit quite similar bankruptcy attributes. However, for 
financially distressed firms all three size groups exhibit sufficiently different survival rates. 
Also, as might be expected from the preceding statistics, a higher hazard rate is found for 
financially distressed firms in Figure 1 than for their bankrupt counterparts, although the 
patterns differ. In line with the previous results, micro firms are most vulnerable to financial 
distress, followed by small and medium firms respectively. For micro firms, the hazard rate for 
financial distress rises but then falls from around 30 years. By contrast, the hazard rate for small 
firms shows a rise until an age of around 20, then plateaus before rising steeply again. The 
pattern to the hazard rate for financial distress for medium firms reports general moderate rise. 
These differences in hazard rates across size categories of bankrupt and financially distressed 
firms reinforces our hypothesis (H1) that default attributes of SMEs vary with firms’ size. 
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Further, the hazard curves do not follow any consistent parametric shape. Thus, a fully non-
parametric baseline hazard specification seems to be an appropriate choice. In light of this 
discussion, in the following section, we employ firm age specific dummy variables in our 
multivariate models to proxy the baseline hazard rate.  
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
4.3 Univariate Hazard Analysis 
The results of univariate modelling are presented in Table 3, with columns reporting on 
findings for SMEs as a whole and for each SMEs size sub-categories, disaggregated by 
bankrupt and financially distressed firms respectively. For each variable, the first row shows 
the coefficient estimates, together with an indication of statistical significance. The second row 
indicates the standard error. The AME are presented in the third row with their ranking (for the 
column concerned). Appropriate Wald statistics are then presented in the final row.   
4.3.1 Non-Cash Flow Covariates 
Section A of Table 3 reports the results for non-cash flow covariates. Earnings 
(EBITDATA) demonstrate discriminatory power over the baseline model for both bankrupt 
and financially distressed firms, with the exception of micro and small firms in the bankrupt 
part. All cases in which this variable presents a statistically significant coefficient, it has also a 
rank for the AME of 6 or better. In the case of bankrupt firms, the effect appears to be driven 
by the medium category, and this result informs the further model specification. In the case of 
short term debt (STDEBV) only the medium category of financially distressed firms indicates 
discriminatory power over the baseline model, though with the expected positive sign for the 
estimated coefficient. The estimated coefficients for the variable cash scaled to total assets 
(CTA) have the expected negative signs and are all statistically significant. Ranks for the AME 
are high, but multicollinearity issues restrict the use of this variable in the full model when 
considering bankrupt firms. Retained earnings (RETA) also have the expected negative and 
statistically significant signs in univariate estimation but have low rank for the AME, with the 
possible exception of bankrupt micro firms. Similarly, capital employed (CETL) has the 
expected negative and statistically significant effect across the board. However, the rank of the 
AME is low for financially distressed firms; this is reflected in the multivariate model 
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specification. Liabilities relative to total assets (TLTA) have a strong effect in a univariate 
setting but the variable is correlated with other variables in the full model, where its use is 
somewhat restricted. In considering the results on capital growth (CAG), which is a variable 
included in most of the multivariate models, the estimated coefficients confirm the expected 
sign. The rank for the AME, especially in the case of bankrupt firms, is high. The Wald 
statistics suggest a different response by size classification. In an examination of the effect of 
taxes (TTA), there are two cases where the estimated coefficients are of an unexpected sign 
(micro in bankrupt firms) or are statistically insignificant (small in bankrupt firms). However, 
in the other univariate results for this variable, the expected positive effect also has a highly 
ranked discriminatory power, commending its inclusion in the multivariate setting. The ratio 
of current assets to liabilities (LCR) ranks most highly for small bankrupt firms, when 
examining the AME, with the lowest rank being for medium-sized financially distressed firms. 
Trade creditors (TCTA) are also found to have significant discriminatory power against the 
baseline model, and the variable ranks highly on the basis of AME. However, the Wald 
statistics do not suggest that the effects differ greatly across different categories of bankrupt 
firms. Greater levels of financial expense (FETA) have the expected positive effect on default 
probability (relative to the estimated baseline). The variable also ranks highest on the basis of 
AME for all but one case, and the response appears to be different across size categories. The 
variable measuring intangible assets (IATA) has no discernible discriminatory power above 
the baseline model for bankrupt firms and the AME are ranked low where this is the case of 
financially distressed firms.  
4.3.2 Cash flow Covariates 
The remaining sub-set of variables reference operating cash-flows and the results for the 
univariate hazard analyses on these variables may be found in Section B of Table 3. A relatively 
large number of estimated coefficients presents either an unexpected sign and/or is statistically 
insignificant in estimation. For bankrupt firms, operational cash-flows divided by assets 
(CFOTA), liabilities or sales have little discriminatory power relative to the baseline model. 
However, earnings divided by cash-flow (ECFO) provides some evidence of effect for 
bankrupt firms. Cash-flow growth and financial expenses divided by cash-flow (CFOG and 
FECFO) respectively provide little evidence of discriminatory power over the baseline hazard 
22 | P a g e  
 
 
 
model, however. This result is consistent with the findings of similar studies, such as Mazouz 
et al. (2012) and Gupta et al. (2014). 
Cash-flow variables demonstrate some further discriminatory power over the baseline 
model in predicting financial distress. For the variable cash-flow divided by total assets 
(CFOTA) all coefficients are of the expected sign and statistically significant. The AME are 
also significant, however the correlation coefficients were rather high (especially with earnings 
variables). For this reason, this variable was not included in the multivariate models. The level 
of operating cash-flow divided by current liabilities (CFOCL) is of the expected sign and is 
statistically significant both overall and for most classes of financially distressed firms. This 
merits inclusion of the variable in the later analysis, again in conjunction with a consideration 
of any multicollinearity. Where cash-flow is divided by sales (CFOS) the evidence is mixed 
with statistical significance of a coefficient only found in the case of medium sized firms and 
an insignificant Wald statistic. The results are similar where earnings are divided by cash-flow 
from operations (ECFO). However, cash-flow growth (CFOG) provides a more interesting 
case. For all cases of financially distressed firms, the estimated coefficients are of the expected 
sign and are statistically significant. The AME are also significant and there is evidence that 
the effect is different for different size classes of firm. The results for financial expenses 
(FECFO) are counter intuitive and, unlike the CFOG variable, are therefore excluded from the 
multivariate models. 
In line with our observation in Figure 1, an identical set of covariates is significant in 
explaining bankruptcy and financial distress for different SMEs size groups in the majority of 
the cases. However, overall, the coefficients of covariates for micro firms are significantly 
different from SMEs, both in the case of the bankrupt group of firms and in those financially 
distressed. This also holds true for a few covariates within the small and medium size groups 
(e.g. CTA, TLTA, FETA, LRC). As reported in Table 3, the magnitude of coefficients of a 
given covariate also varies significantly across micro, small and medium firms for both 
bankrupt and financially distressed sample groups.  
These results provide preliminary support for our hypotheses H2, H3 and H4.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
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4.4 Multivariate Discrete Hazard Models 
In this section, we estimate multivariate discrete-time duration-dependent hazard models 
with logit link across size categories (respectively for SMEs, micro, small and medium firms) 
for bankruptcy and financial distress respectively. The dependent variable has a binary outcome 
with financially distressed/bankrupt equal to ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise, while independent variables 
are the set of covariates found to be significant in the univariate regression analysis. 
Considering the multicollinearity among the covariates, we introduce each significant covariate 
in turn into the multivariate setup based on the magnitude (sign is ignored) of their AME. For 
this, we first rank7 all the covariates found to be significant (with the expected sign) in the 
univariate analysis, based on the absolute value of their AME. Following Gupta et al. (2018), 
we then introduce each covariate in turn into the multivariate model in increasing order of the 
rank of their AME, the rationale being the higher the value of AME, the higher the change in 
the predicted probability due to a unit change in the covariate. Thus, a covariate with a higher 
value of AME (e.g. FETA) is more efficient in discriminating between distressed and censored 
firms than covariates with lower values of AME (e.g. TLTA). Further, if the introduction of a 
covariate flips the sign of any previously added covariate, then that covariate is excluded from 
the multivariate model. This situation can possibly occur due to multicollinearity among 
covariates; accordingly, excluding these covariates seems to be a reasonable choice. We 
believe that this method of covariate introduction, while developing the multivariate models, 
leaves us with the best set of covariates with the expected sign of respective coefficients. 
Initially the multivariate models are estimated using financial ratios obtained from the income 
statement and balance sheet only, as, amongst others, we examine the information content of 
cash-flow information. Subsequently, we estimate an additional set of models supplemented 
with significant operating cash flow ratios. We also control for a volatile macroeconomic 
environment affecting specific industrial sectors. For this, we calculate an additional measure 
of industry risk (Risk) separately for SMEs, micro, small, and medium firms as the failure 
(bankrupt/financial distress) rate (number of firms experiencing the event of interest in 
respective industrial sectors and respective size categories in a given year/total number of firms 
in that industrial sector and size category in that year) in each of the seven industrial sectors in 
                                                 
7 However, cash-flow ratios are not included in the ranking process to assess their incremental information content 
above information obtained from income statement and balance sheet. 
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a given year8. Higher values indicate a higher failure risk, and vice versa. To assess the 
classification and validation performance of the models developed, area under ROC curves are 
also estimated (further details of these analyses can be found in Graph A1 and Graph A2 in the 
Appendix). 
4.4.1 Multivariate Hazard Models for Bankrupt Firms 
SMEs: We start with a report on the multivariate hazard model for bankrupt SMEs 
without cash-flow variables in the first column of Table 4. The last rows of this column report 
on the goodness of fit measures. The Wald Chi Squared measure indicates that the included 
variables are jointly statistically significant at a 99% level. Both within sample and out-of-
sample AUROC statistics confirm that the model performs well, with both values over 70%.  
Capital employed divided by total liabilities (CETL) and capital growth (CAG) show the 
expected negative sign, which is statistically significant at the 99% level. Their AMEs are also 
statistically significant. Accordingly, firms are less likely to file for bankruptcy when in the 
presence of higher levels of capital. Similarly, firms with stronger capital growth are also less 
likely to file for bankruptcy. Taxes (TTA) also have the expected negative effect on the 
probability of bankruptcy. Although the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at a 
95% level, this cannot be said for the AME. Thus, the conclusion on the effect of taxes is 
mixed, certainly in terms of economic significance. Trade creditors (TCTA) do not have an 
effect on the basis of the results presented for SMEs, however financial expenses (FETA) do. 
Both the estimated coefficient and the AME have a statistically significant effect at a 99% level 
in their positive effect on the probability of bankruptcy. The accuracy of results as well as the 
signs and significance of few variables for SMEs are compatible with the results of similar 
studies such as Altman and Sabato (2007) and Altman et al. (2010). However, as shown in the 
next sections, the impact of the variables and their significance vary when we divide SMEs 
into respective size categories.  
The addition of a cash-flow variable, namely earnings divided by cash-flow (ECFO)9, 
does bring further predictive power. This is not to the extent that there are any changes in the 
                                                 
8 Further information on the industrial classification can be found in the Appendix (Table A2). 
9 The Wald test confirms the joint significance of the variables and the AUROC results are equivalent. 
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interpretation of the variables from the first model. The estimated coefficient for ECFO is 
negative as expected and the result statistically significant at a 99% level. This provides further 
support for concluding that earnings mediated by cash-flow is a significant influence on the 
probability of bankruptcy, as the AME is also statistically significant (though only at a 90% 
confidence level).  
Micro Firms: In the case of the micro category of firms, the previous univariate analysis 
and the review of the correlation matrix recommended i) the exclusion of taxes (TTA) and 
trade creditors over total assets (TCTA); and ii) the inclusion of two further variables (namely, 
short term cash and investments (CTA) and retained earnings (RTA). Both CTA and RETA 
are not statistically significant for estimation in the multivariate model without the cash-flow 
variables. Compared to the SMEs category, capital employed (CETL) retains the expected sign 
and significance for both the coefficient and AME. The result of a Wald test of the equivalence 
of the coefficients from the micro firms shows that there is no significant difference between 
the two coefficients. The coefficient on capital growth (CAG) is negative and statistically 
significant, as in the SME case. Conversely, the result for AME - even with the same sign - 
loses its statistical significance. The Wald test finds no difference between the value for this 
coefficient and the one for the SMEs as a whole. The result related to financial expenses 
(FETA) seems to uncover a different role played by this covariate in predicting bankruptcy. As 
in the SME case, FETA is found to be statistically significant both in estimation and in the 
average marginal effect. However, this ratio of financial expenses to cash-flow has an estimated 
coefficient that is half the size of that for SMEs as a whole, and the AME is much lower for 
micro firms. This is confirmed by the Wald test for the equality of coefficients, leading to the 
conclusion that the FETA is significant in predicting bankruptcy but the size of effect is lower.  
The results described in this section are not entirely consistent with the relevant studies, 
such as Gupta et al. (2015). This study finds CTA and RETA, two significant indicators of 
micro firms’ financial failure. However, they suggest that micro firms should be considered 
separately in the process of failure prediction, which is in line with our findings. The inclusion 
of the previous cash-flow variable (ECFO) does not add to the explanatory power of the model. 
This result seems to be in contrast to the model for SMEs as a whole.   
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Small Firms: The third results column for Table 4 references the estimates predicting 
bankruptcy for small firms, in a model excluding the cash-flow variables. Goodness of fit 
measures indicate that the included variables are jointly significant and there is a reasonably 
high predictive power both within and outside sample. Three variables were included based on 
the univariate analysis: i) capital growth (CAG) and financial expenses (FETA) as in the SMEs 
model; and ii) ratio of current assets to liabilities (LCR), which has not been considered before. 
CAG has the expected negative sign for the coefficient and is statistically significant at a 99% 
level. In scale, the estimated coefficient is larger in absolute terms than that for SMEs as a 
whole; however, the Wald test does not indicate that there is a significant difference. LCR has 
the expected negative sign, is statistically significant at a 99% level, and has a significant 
average marginal effect. FETA appears consistently through our modelling of bankruptcy 
prediction and has the expected positive sign here with a statistically significant estimated 
coefficient and AME. However, in contrast to the finding for micro firms, the Wald test for the 
equality of coefficients does not suggest that there is a difference between small firms and 
SMEs as a whole. 
The addition of the cash-flow variable earnings divided by cash-flow (ECFO) does not 
add to the explanatory/predictive power of the model in this case, leaving the findings for the 
first model, immediately above, to stand.  
Medium Firms: The model specification10 for medium firms differs slightly from the 
univariate analysis. An examination of the correlation coefficients for this sample i) admitted 
earnings (EBITDATA), liabilities divided by assets (TLTA) and the (log of) current assets 
divided by current liabilities (LCR) to the model; and ii) excluded the trade creditors over total 
assets (TCTA). The coefficient on EBITDATA carries the expected negative sign and is 
statistically significant at a 95% level, although the AME is not statistically significant. Capital 
employed divided by total liabilities (CETL) is statistically insignificant in estimation. This 
result seems to be inconsistent with the results of Gupta et al. (2015). However, total liabilities 
divided by total assets (TLTA) has the expected positive coefficient in estimation and is 
statistically significant at a 95% level. The AME is not statistically significant, suggesting that 
                                                 
10 The included variables are jointly significant at a 95% level and the model has the highest in sample AUROC 
value for all of the bankruptcy models.  
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the finding is not robust across all observations. Capital growth (CAG) was found to have a 
significant effect on the probability of default in all previous models; conversely, it is not the 
case for the medium-sized firm category. Taxes (TTA) do not have an effect, although the 
coefficient is of the expected sign. The (log of) current assets divided by current liabilities 
(LCR) does have the expected sign for the estimated coefficient, but the AME is not significant. 
As noted earlier, financial expenses relative to assets (FETA) is of the expected positive sign 
and also statistically significant. As the coefficient estimate is similar in size to that for SMEs 
as a whole it is perhaps unsurprising that the Wald test fails to reject the null of equivalence 
(although of course note should be taken that the test is of a different nature). 
No cash-flow variables were suggested as an addition to the above and so no further 
model results are presented for the medium firms’ category. 
In summary, from this analysis, we can conclude that factors affecting the bankruptcy of 
SMEs do vary across size categories. Amongst others, we highlighted the different role play 
by FETA in predicting bankruptcy of micro-sized firms compared to the SMEs category. 
Furthermore, in contrast with Gentry et al. (1987) and Gilbert et al. (1990), CFO information 
does not provide any marginal improvement in models’ classification performance above 
information obtained from income statements and balance sheets. These results for micro, 
small and medium SMEs strongly support our two hypotheses H2 and H3. At the same time, 
they are not entirely consistent with Gupta et al. (2015), who conclude that there is no need to 
consider small and medium categorised firms separately in modelling their credit risk. Finally, 
the analysis leads us to accept H4 only in the univariate dimension, as operating cash flow 
information does not add any marginal increment in prediction performance of hazard models 
above income statement and balance sheet in the multivariate framework. Our results 
corroborate the empirical evidence provided by Gupta et al. (2015) for our sample of  UK 
SMEs.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.4.2 Multivariate Hazard Model for Financially Distressed Firms 
Firms that have declared bankruptcy have, arguably, experienced greater problems than 
those that are in some form of financial distress. However, as discussed earlier and following 
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the argument of Keasey et al. (2014), financial distress may also be the source of losses to firms 
and external providers of capital. As noted in Section 3, the proportion of firms of all types that 
are financially distressed in any year is large relative to the proportion that declare bankruptcy 
and, perhaps because of the greater number of cases, a larger number of variables enter as 
significant in the models. Table 5 illustrates multivariate hazard models for financially 
distressed firms. Goodness of fit measures for all of the estimated models indicate that the 
included variables are jointly significant at a 99% level. All of the AUROC statistics, both 
within and out of sample, are over 0.8. These values signal that the estimated models fit well 
and exhibit a very good performance in predicting financial distress, whether within or out of 
sample. 
SMEs: In line with the analysis performed in Section 4.4.1, we estimate a model in which 
cash-flow variables have been excluded. Earnings relative to assets (EBITDATA) carry the 
expected negative coefficient and the variable is statistically significant at a 99% level. This is 
also the case for the average marginal effect. This conforms to our expectation that higher 
earnings will forestall financial distress in the following year. The same results apply to i) cash 
and short-term investments (CTA); ii) capital employed relative to total liabilities (CETL); iii) 
asset liability ratio (LCR), although the size of effect is relatively small; and iv) capital growth 
(CAG). The result for CAG carries from the model on bankruptcy. Taxes (TTA) follows the 
same pattern of the previous variable, showing a particularly robust finding across both 
financial distress and bankruptcy. This evidence shows that higher taxes reduce the probability 
of distress with a statistically significant coefficient and AME. Consistent with the preceding 
set of results, higher financial expenses (FETA) predict an increase in the probability of 
financial distress. Firms that are not performing well may face greater financial costs, either 
from restructuring or re-financing, or perhaps as the cost of funds is raised to reflect a 
perception of increased risk. 
The model for financial distress including cash-flow variables adds two further 
covariates: cash-flow divided by liabilities (CFOCL) and cash-flow growth (CFOG). The effect 
on the overall fit of the model is minor, with the Wald test and AUROC statistics suggesting 
that the overall level of explanation is high. The two-included cash-flow variables are 
statistically significant in estimation and in the AME, both with the expected negative sign. 
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Amongst all the variables discussed in the previous model, only the log ratio of current assets 
to liabilities (LCR) has a significant change in the value of the estimated coefficient and AME. 
These retain the expected negative sign but they more than double in absolute size. Omitting 
the cash-flow variables would, therefore, bias the finding for LCR.  
Micro Firms: The specification of the model for financial distress in micro firms is 
similar to that for SMEs as a whole. Trade creditors (TCTA) enter the model for micro firms 
(whereas this was not the case for SMEs), whilst capital employed relative to total liabilities 
(CETL) was not included this time. Both earnings (EBITDATA) and short-term cash and 
investments (CTA) have the expected negative sign and are statistically significant in 
estimation, referencing both the estimated coefficients and the AME. The Wald test on the 
equality of coefficients rejects the null in both cases, with the conclusion that for both variables 
the effects are smaller in the case of micro firms. The same conclusions may be drawn in 
reference to capital growth (CAG) and taxes (TTA). The effects are statistically significant and 
of the expected sign, but smaller in scale compared to SMEs as a whole. However, when we 
consider the (log) ratio of current assets to current liabilities (LCR), the finding is different. 
Although this variable is still statistically significant in estimation, the effect is significantly 
larger for micro firms (as confirmed by the Wald statistic). Conforming to expectations, the 
sign on the variable trade creditors (TCTA) is positive and statistically significant in reference 
to the estimated coefficient and the AME, although only at a 90% confidence level in both 
cases. It is worthwhile noting that the coefficient is smaller than those for the larger sized 
classifications. Common across all results, higher financial expenses (FETA) give a greater 
probability of financial distress. The effect is also larger than the estimated coefficient for the 
SME model. 
The growth in operating cash flow (CFOG) is added to create the further model of 
financial distress in micro firms. CFOG has the expected negative effect on the probability of 
distress and is statistically significant in estimation, including AME. There is no qualitative 
difference between the other results for this model and the previous one. 
Small Firms: The model specifications are the same for small and micro firms. Findings 
on the sign and statistical significance of estimated coefficients and AME are the same, 
although some differences emerge in the size of effects to which we now turn for the model 
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without the cash-flow variable. Earnings relative to assets (EBITDATA), cash and short-term 
investments (CTA) and capital growth (CAG) have a larger negative effect on the probability 
of distress for small firms and the estimated coefficient is statistically different from that of 
SMEs as a whole. Taxes (TTA) also appear to have a greater negative effect on distress 
probability than was the case for micro firms, although the Wald test indicates that the effect 
cannot be distinguished from the effect for SMEs as a whole. The log ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities (LRC) has very similar effects to those found for micro firms, diminishing 
the probability of distress as the value rises. Trade creditors (TCTA) have a larger (positive) 
estimated coefficient but the AME is similar, although we are more certain of this finding in 
reference to small firms. As in all other cases, financial expenses (FETA) have a significant 
positive effect on the probability of financial distress. 
The above results change slightly with the addition of a cash flow variable (namely, 
CFOG). CFOG is statistically significant in estimation, as is AME. Therefore, we might 
conclude that the addition of this variable does add to the predictive power of the model. 
Medium Firms: Earnings relative to assets (EBITDATA) remain statistically significant 
in estimation, with a relatively large coefficient in absolute terms. This suggests the presence 
of a greater reduction in the likelihood of financial distress in correspondence of increasing 
earnings. However, this finding carries a greater standard deviation. The low values of AME 
indicate that the effect is relatively small across all observations. Larger levels of short term 
debt (STEBV) result in an increase in the probability of financial distress. Both the estimated 
coefficient and AME are found to be statistically significant. The effect of cash and short-term 
investments (CTA) is of the expected negative sign, although again with the findings that the 
relatively large absolute value of the estimated coefficient is reversed in considering the AME. 
Capital growth (CAG) reduces the chance of financial distress in medium sized firms, as does 
an incidence of higher tax (TTA). More trade debt results in an increased probability of 
financial distress, as might be noted from the positive and statistically significant estimated 
coefficient and AME on trade creditors (TCTA). The consistent finding on financial expenses 
(FETA) remains. It is worth noticing that the estimated coefficient is statistically different from 
the result pertaining from SMEs as a whole. 
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The inclusion of cash-flow variables improves the fit of the model as measured by the 
log likelihood, and both within and out-of-sample AUROC figures. The lower the conversion 
rate from earnings into cash-flow (ECFO), the lower the probability of financial distress. In 
line with previous models, cash-flow growth (CFOG) is found to reduce the distress 
probability. The scale of effect is similar to that for other size classes. 
Although there is not much variation in the factors affecting financial distress of SMEs 
and its size categories, the impact of those factors varies significantly across size categories. 
This can be observed from the differences in the magnitude of coefficients and additionally 
from the significance of Wald statistics. CFO does not seem to play a convincing role in 
predicting either financial distress or, as described in Section 4.4.1, bankruptcy of the US 
SMEs. These results strongly support H3, but do not entirely support H2 and H4.    
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
5. Conclusion 
Both bankruptcy and financial distress can impose considerable costs on firms and their 
suppliers of capital. Consequently, understanding such events is important for firms, financial 
institutions, shareholders and government. Considerable advances have been made in 
identifying the determinants as well as the prediction of bankruptcy and financial distress. This 
paper contributes to this debate by providing important further insights on the determinants and 
extent to which they affect both bankruptcy and financial distress in different SMEs size 
categories. Based on our findings, we can conclude that not all SMEs are the same and the 
determinants of bankruptcy are different across different size categories of SMEs. More 
specifically, evidence presented in this study offers strong support to the fact that the failure 
rate of SMEs varies across micro, small and medium size categories (H1). Moreover, factors 
that are mutually significant in predicting failure likelihood of SMEs and micro, small, or 
medium firms respectively, exhibit significant differences in the magnitude of their coefficient 
in respective models (H3). However, our results are not conclusive when we consider the 
factors affecting SMEs failure (bankruptcy vs financial distress) likelihood across size 
categories (H2). In particular, earnings and ratio of assets to liabilities are only found to be 
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important for the largest size category. Financial expenses are almost always considered 
important to predict failure, but the size of the effect varies across different SMEs categories 
(especially for micro firms). We also present compelling evidence that estimated coefficients 
are different between models for financial distress estimates concerning SMEs as a whole, as 
well as across different SMEs size categories. These results seem to suggest that forecasters 
would therefore be advised that distinct models for bankruptcy or financial distress should be 
specified not in reference to SMEs as a whole but rather in consideration of the different size 
classifications. 
The presence of cash-flows in explaining SMEs failure leads to mixed results. In contrast 
to the work of  Gentry et al. (1987) and Gilbert et al. (1990) on SMEs (as a whole), this study 
does not find that cash-flow contributes to an understanding of bankruptcy (H4). It is, however, 
in line with the findings of Gupta et al. (2014) who also report the inability of CFO information 
to predict the bankruptcy likelihood of UK SMEs. Our results complement the findings of 
Charitou et al. (2004) for the UK in explaining financial distress using cash-flows in different 
size categories. Building on Bernard and Stober's (1989) argument, we believe that explanation 
of these results can be found in the fact that cash-flow figures are easy for managers to 
manipulate but the incentive to do so may be stronger where the firm is facing bankruptcy, 
conflating the estimated effect. 
There are a number of differences in the estimated determinants of financial distress as 
opposed to bankruptcy. Firms with greater holdings of cash and short-term investments are less 
likely to face financial distress. Taxes are consistently found to have an effect on financial 
distress, but this is not the case for bankruptcy, where only the model across SMEs as a whole 
provides evidence of a significant effect. There is also evidence that the effect of the ratio of 
current assets to liabilities is different across different classes of firm in predicting financial 
distress. The value of trade debt predicts financial distress, concordant with the findings of 
Hudson (1986) and Beck et al. (2006). Possibly the value of trade credit is reduced as a firm 
appears more likely to file for bankruptcy, explaining the different result. 
To conclude, bankruptcy and financial distress are distinct events and separate modeling 
of them will lead to improved risk pricing. Similarly, our results on US SMEs indicate that 
separate modeling is required for each SMEs size category. Consideration of both the failure 
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type and the SMEs size category has an impact on the implementation of firm policy on 
financial structure and cash-flow management, on bank lending policy and government policy 
relating to support for SMEs, and on legal arrangements surrounding financial restructuring 
and liquidation.  
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Table 1: Covariates Analysed 
Covariates Definition Compustat Data Item 
EBITDATA 
Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and 
amortization/total assets 
EBITDA/AT 
STDEBV Short term debt/equity book value DLC/SEQ 
CTA Cash and short-term investments/total assets CHE/AT 
RETA Retained earnings/total assets RE/AT 
CETL Capital employed/total liabilities (AT – LCT)/LT 
TLTA Total liabilities/total assets LT/AT 
CAG Capital growth; calculated as (Capitalt / Capitalt-1) – 1 (AT - LCT) 
TTA Taxes/total assets TXT/AT 
LCR ln(current assets/current liabilities) ln(ACT/LCT) 
TCTA Trade creditors/total assets AP/AT 
FETA Financial Expense/total assets XINT/AT 
IATA Intangible Assets/total assets INTAN/AT 
CFOTA Cash flow from operations/total assets OANCF/AT 
CFOCL Cash flow from operations/current liabilities OANCF/LCT 
CFOS Cash flow from operations/sales OANCF/SALE 
ECFO 
Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and 
amortization /cash flow from operations 
EBITDA/OANCF 
CFOG 
Operating cash flow growth; calculates as (Cash flow 
from operations t / cash flow from operations t-1) – 1 
OANCF 
FECFO Financial Expenses/ cash flow from operations XINT/OANCF 
Notes: This table lists the set of covariates, along with their respective definitions, used for our empirical analysis. The last 
column presents the specific Compustat database items we used to construct the covariates. 
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Table 2: Sample Description 
Year 
Bankrupt Financially Distressed 
SME Micro Small  Medium SME Micro Small  Medium 
D | C | %D D | C | %D D | C | %D D | C | %D D | C | %D D | C | %D D | C | %D D | C | %D 
1990 20|1423|1.39 8|361|2.17 5|452|1.09 7|610|1.13 275|1168|19.06 104|265|28.18 99|358|21.66 72|545|11.67 
1991 29|1856|1.54 9|485|1.82 10|582|1.69 10|789|1.25 359|1526|19.05 139|355|28.14 120|472|20.27 100|699|12.52 
1992 18|1850|0.96 8|454|1.73 5|596|0.83 5|800|0.62 324|1544|17.34 132|330|28.57 104|497|17.30 88|717|10.93 
1993 22|1924|1.13 9|438|2.01 6|622|0.96 7|864|0.80 271|1675|13.93 119|328|26.62 82|546|13.06 70|801|8.04 
1994 15|1971|0.76 7|453|1.52 3|499|0.50 5|919|0.54 265|1724|13.34 119|341|25.87 78|524|12.96 68|856|7.36 
1995 15|1976|0.75 10|424|2.30 4|586|0.68 1|966|0.10 274|1717|13.76 108|326|24.88 89|501|15.08 77|890|7.96 
1996 21|1999|1.04 11|425|2.52 3|568|0.53 7|1006|0.69 301|1719|14.90 120|316|27.52 101|470|17.69 80|933|7.90 
1997 22|2215|0.98 11|472|2.28 5|626|0.79 6|1117|0.53 317|1920|14.17 125|358|25.88 101|530|16.01 91|1032|8.10 
1998 20|2081|0.95 8|466|1.69 8|574|1.37 4|1041|0.38 369|1732|17.56 129|345|27.22 113|469|19.42 127|918|12.15 
1999 18|1916|0.93 7|451|1.53 7|537|1.30 4|933|0.43 413|1521|21.35 152|306|33.19 125|414|23.19 136|801|14.51 
2000 14|1996|0.70 9|491|1.80 2|521|0.38 3|984|0.30 393|1617|19.55 151|349|30.20 116|407|22.18 126|861|12.77 
2001 18|1962|0.91 13|558|2.28 1|508|0.20 4|896|0.44 431|1549|21.77 119|372|34.85 116|393|22.79 116|784|12.89 
2002 12|1978|0.60 8|627|1.26 1|480|0.21 3|871|0.34 588|1402|29.55 299|336|47.09 142|339|29.52 147|727|16.82 
2003 12|1854|0.64 8|638|1.24 3|441|0.68 1|775|0.13 514|1325|28.99 282|364|43.65 132|312|29.73 127|649|16.37 
2004 11|1802|0.61 8|640|1.23 1|394|0.25 2|768|0.26 475|1338|26.20 261|387|40.28 97|298|24.56 117|653|15.19 
2005 13|1693|0.76 12|611|1.93 1|387|0.26 0|695|0.00 384|1322|22.51 215|408|34.51 87|301|22.42 82|613|11.80 
2006 10|1545|0.64 6|562|1.06 3|335|0.89 1|648|0.15 389|1166|25.02 220|348|38.73 88|250|26.04 81|568|12.48 
2007 5|1443|0.35 4|516|0.77 0|308|0.00 1|619|0.16 360|1088|24.86 194|326|37.21 72|326|23.38 94|526|15.16 
2008 5|1235|0.40 3|460|0.65 0|266|0.00 2|509|0.39 330|910|26.61 169|294|36.50 73|193|27.44 88|423|17.22 
2009 5|1232|0.40 2|442|0.45 1|258|0.39 2|532|0.37 400|837|32.34 209|235|47.07 82|177|31.66 109|425|20.41 
2010 2|1155|0.17 1|426|0.23 1|244|0.41 0|485|0.00 363|794|31.37 196|231|45.90 67|178|27.35 100|385|20.62 
2011 1|1055|0.09 0|405|0.00 0|221|0.00 1|429|0.23 279|777|26.42 157|248|38.77 60|161|27.15 62|368|14.42 
2012 1|1044|0.10 1|416|0.24 0|218|0.00 0|410|0.00 291|754|27.85 173|244|41.49 57|161|26.15 61|349|14.88 
2013 2|1099|0.18 2|494|0.40 0|228|0.00 0|377|0.00 348|753|31.61 173|244|41.49 67|161|29.39 74|303|19.63 
2014 0|311|0.00 0|134|0.00 0|76|0.00 0|101|0.00 96|215|30.87 66|68|49.25 15|61|19.74 15|86|14.85 
Notes: This table represents the sample of US SMEs used in our analysis. Year-wise description of bankrupt and financially distressed SMEs, micro, small, and medium firms are listed in respective 
columns. In “D | C | %D”, ‘D’ represents number of events of interest witnessed, ‘C’ represents number of censored observations and ‘%D’ is calculated as D/(D+C)×100.  
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Table 3: Univariate Hazard Analysis 
  Bankrupt Firms Financially Distressed Firms 
 Section A: Non-Cash Flow Covariates 
Covariates Sign SME Micro Small Medium SME Micro Small Medium 
EBITDATA -         
β  -0.9120a 0.0210 -0.4133 -2.5247a -3.0847a -2.3999a -3.2123a -6.0694a 
SE  0.2014 0.3026 0.4576 0.5616 0.0510 0.0745 0.1133 0.1909 
dy/dx [R]  -0.446a[5] 0.018[.] -0.169[.] -0.156a[5] -31.18a[5] -48.90a[5] -30.86a[6] -15.73a[4] 
Wald Sig.  ---- ---- ---- 0.0275b ---- 0.0000a 0.2959 0.0000a 
STDEBV +         
β  -0.4559b -0.2621 0.0262 -.05236 -0.3531a -1.0013a -0.0900 0.6608a 
SE  0.2146 0.3493 0.4241 0.4338 0.0436 0.0741 0.0821 0.0825 
dy/dx [R]  -0.274b[.] -0.134[.] 0.017[.] -0.101[.] -4.047a[.] -21.19a[.] -1.08[.] 3.039a[9] 
Wald Sig.  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
CTA -         
β  -1.3072a -0.8276c -4.4336a -3.3977a -2.0163a -2.0799a -2.9400a -2.4626a 
SE  0.3558 0.4510 1.0984 1.0629 0.0804 0.0998 0.1804 0.2011 
dy/dx [R]  -0.84a[4] -0.474c[4] -0.129b[5] -0.109a[9] -21.89a[6] -43.33a[6] -33.16a[4] -10.15a[6] 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.5034 0.0200b 0.0753c ---- 0.6421 0.0000a 0.0189b 
RETA -         
β  -0.1386a -0.0774b -0.0210 -0.2568a -0.2969a -0.2662 -0.2753a -0.3923a 
SE  0.0227 0.0335 0.0559 0.0645 0.0053 0.0079 0.0111 0.0165 
dy/dx [R]  -0.07a[10] -0.041b[8] -0.008[.] -0.05b[10] -3.45a[10] -5.636a[.] -3.25a[11] -1.75a[11] 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.1191 ---- 0.1560 ---- ---- 0.0830c 0.0000a 
CETL -         
β  -0.4190a -0.2435a -0.8874a -1.5806a -1.0624a -0.7092a -1.0799a -1.8825a 
SE  0.0528 0.0595 0.1757 0.2474 0.0189 0.0189 0.0387 0.0601 
dy/dx [R]  -0.21a[8] -0.085a[6] -0.127b[6] -0.167[4] -5.512a[9] -10.84a[9] -5.78a[10] -1.38a[12] 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.0276b 0.0240b 0.0000a ---- 0.0000a 0.6846 0.0000a 
TLTA +         
β  1.9864a 1.2101a 1.9772a 3.6502a 3.0732a 2.4592a 3.1442a 4.7703a 
SE  0.1672 0.2290 0.3518 0.3859 0.0430 0.0548 0.0949 0.1372 
dy/dx [R]  1.18a[3] 0.596a[3] 0.116c[7] 0.123[8] 31.690a[4] 49.83a[4] 32.76a[5] 14.149a[5] 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.0137b 0.7661 0.0008a ---- 0.0000a 0.4916 0.0000a 
CAG -         
β  -0.7420a -0.3330a -1.3020a -1.5398a -0.7450a -0.2824a -1.1131a -1.9619a 
SE  0.1166 0.1424 0.3114 0.3244 0.0213 0.0263 0.0507 0.0724 
dy/dx [R]  -0.426a[6] -0.163b[5] -0.523b[3] -0.332a[3] -8.259a[8] -5.95a[10] -12.11a[8] -6.501a[7] 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.0272b 0.1268 0.0322b ---- 0.0000a 0.0000a 0.0000a 
TTA -         
β  -11.5546a 0.6543 -9.0858 -17.4265a -24.0440a -9.8952a -25.717a -27.6011a 
SE  4.1909 8.5017 8.4212 6.7336 1.0332 2.0325 2.1411 1.6183 
dy/dx [R]  -7.097a[2] 0.245[.] -0.244[.] -0.661b[2] -201a[2] -208a[2] -302a[1] -103a[2] 
  ---- ---- ---- 0.4435 ---- 0.0000a 0.4766 0.0669c 
LCR -         
β  -0.7593a -0.2315b -1.2774a -1.952a -1.3956a -1.1283a -1.4131a -1.8027a 
SE  0.0900 0.1112 0.2284 0.2602 0.0226 0.0287 0.0484 0.0625 
dy/dx [R]  -0.381a[7] -0.083c[7] -0.288c[4] -0.127c[7] -12.96a[7] -22.04a[7] -13.43a[7] -4.976a[8] 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.0003a 0.0892c 0.0003a ---- 0.0000a 0.7365 0.0000 
TCTA +         
β  3.9728a 2.3930a 3.5891a 7.4751a 7.8283a 6.8795a 8.5441a 7.7549a 
SE  0.6489 0.8787 1.5202 1.5738 0.1511 0.1926 0.3410 0.3769 
dy/dx [R]  0.210a[9] 0.836b[2] 0.55b[2] 0.141a[6] 87.33a[3] 144a[3] 94.87a[3] 34.68a[3] 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.1632 0.5463 0.0769c ---- 0.0001a 0.0530b 0.8853 
FETA +         
β  18.7490a 9.9275a 21.6106a 35.7482a 21.4210a 17.4174a 21.328a 30.8303a 
SE  1.8667 2.5761 4.0511 4.1180 0.4052 0.5206 0.8292 1.0895 
dy/dx [R]  9.383a[1] 3.6a[1] 9.063c[1] 11.247c[1] 205a[1] 370a[1] 256a[2] 131a[1] 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.0079a 0.7503 0.0019a ---- 0.0000a 0.9247 0.0000a 
IATA +         
β  -1.1954c -1.4373 0.9257 -1.4606 0.1770 0.5922a 0.8760a 0.4645a 
SE  0.7317 1.1445 1.3502 1.4294 0.1305 0.1983 0.2662 0.2589 
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dy/dx [R]  -0.682[.] -0.76[.] 0.361[.] -0.172[.] 2.018[.] 12.48a[8] 10.61a[9] 2.151c[10] 
Wald Sig.  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 Section B: Cash Flow Covariates 
CFOTA -         
β  -0.4433b 0.1812 0.2735 -1.7382a -2.3708a -1.7235a -2.2602a -3.9332a 
SE  0.2145 0.2944 0.5488 0.6228 0.0482 0.0673 0.1045 0.1498 
dy/dx  -0.265b 0.063 0.112 -0.444b -26.84a -35.93a -25.56a -16.65a 
Wald Sig.  ---- ---- ---- 0.0682c ---- 0.0000a 0.3410 0.0000a 
CFOCL -         
β  0.1224c 0.4140a 0.1858 -0.2102 -.09476a 0.3118a -0.1124a -0.6640a 
SE  0.0659 0.0931 0.1505 0.1674 0.0144 0.0197 0.0284 0.0365 
dy/dx  0.068c 0.142a 0.078 -0.038 -1.087a 6.55a -1.35a -3.00a 
Wald Sig.  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.5691 0.0000a 
CFOS -         
β  0.0032 0.0117a 0.0013 0.2024 -0.0052a 0.0009 -0.0034 -0.0060c 
SE  0.0027 0.0032 0.0146 0.2779 0.0005 0.0006 0.0025 0.0037 
dy/dx [R]  0.018 0.004a 0.005 0.037 -0.06a 0.020 -0.041 -0.02c 
Wald Sig.  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.8754 
ECFO -         
β  -0.1044a -0.1227c -0.1849b -0.1000 0.0321 0.0913a 0.0410a -0.0690a 
SE  0.0404 0.0666 0.0876 0.0766 0.0083 0.0140 0.0168 0.0151 
dy/dx   -0.056a -0.058c -0.347c -0.029 0.366a 1.923a 0.400b -0.320a 
Wald Sig.  ---- 0.7901 0.4273 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
CFOG -         
β  -0.0352 -0.0474 -0.0018 -0.1143 -0.0477a -0.0878a -0.0345b -0.0419a 
SE  0.0376 0.0607 0.0764 0.0737 0.0080 0.0136 0.0157 0.0145 
dy/dx   -0.021 -0.024 -0.001 -0.023 -0.543a -1.851a -0.417b -0.194a 
Wald Sig.  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0117b 0.4518 0.7266 
FECFO +         
β  -0.0585 0.1489 0.1800 -0.2574 -0.4518a -0.4536a -0.4109a -0.4253a 
SE  0.1239 0.2258 0.2387 0.2210 0.0277 0.0512 0.0515 0.0475 
dy/dx   -0.034 0.007 0.112 -0.072 -5.184a -9.59a -4.95a -1.986a 
Wald Sig.  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents the univariates analysis results for bankrupt 
and financially distressed groups of firms. Further, under each group analysis results are listed for SMEs, micro, small and medium firms 
respectively. ‘β’ is the regression coefficient, ‘SE’ is the standard error and ‘dy/dx’ is the average marginal effect (AME) obtained from 
univariate regression estimates of respective covariates for respective groups. dy/dx for the bankrupt group of firms are multiplied by 
10,000, while for financially distressed firms it is multiplied by 100. ‘Wald Sig.’ is the p-value obtained from the Wald test of equality 
of coefficients of significant covariates of SMEs with other groups (micro, small and medium firms) for respective significant covariates. 
‘[R]’ is the rank of covariates obtained by arranging the absolute values of AME of respective covariates in ascending order.   The ‘Sign’ 
column reports the expected sign of the respective covariates in the regression analysis.    
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Table 4: Multivariate Hazard Models for Bankrupt Firms 
Covariates Sign 
Without CFO Ratios With CFO Ratio 
SMEs Micro Small Medium SMEs Micro Small  Medium 
EBITDATA -         
β     -1.9328b     
SE     0.9562     
dy/dx      -0.0038     
Wald Sig.          
STDEBV +         
β          
SE          
dy/dx [R]          
Wald Sig.          
CTA -         
β   -0.1565    -0.2122   
SE   0.5995    0.6019   
dy/dx    -0.013    -0.0154   
Wald Sig.          
RETA -         
β   -0.0325    -0.0383   
SE   0.0495    0.0498   
dy/dx    -0.002    -0.0027   
Wald Sig.          
CETL -         
β  -0.2016a -0.2337a  -0.1132 -0.2045a -0.2305a   
SE  0.0608 0.0825  0.3242 0.0612 0.0826   
dy/dx   -0.044a -0.0168b  -0.0002 -0.040a -0.0167b   
Wald Sig.   0.6671  0.8513     
TLTA +         
β     2.7366a     
SE     0.9734     
dy/dx      0.0054     
CAG -         
β  -0.5451a -0.3118c -1.4726a -0.3651 -0.5441a -0.3111c -1.4657a  
SE  0.1209 0.1677 0.4894 0.3489 0.1210 0.1682 0.4899  
dy/dx [R]  -0.121a -0.0225 -1.424a -0.0007 -0.109a -0.0225 -1.108a  
Wald Sig.   0.2293 0.1041 0.7390     
TTA -         
β  -8.7883b   -3.5408 -8.2080c    
SE  4.7165   9.7533 4.7329    
dy/dx   -1.940   -0.007 -1.643    
Wald Sig.          
LCR -         
β    -1.6270a -0.9449b   -1.6309a  
SE    0.4069 0.4472   0.4080  
dy/dx     -1.573a -0.0018   -1.233a  
Wald Sig.          
TCTA +         
β  1.2189    1.3165    
SE  0.8229    0.8274    
dy/dx   0.270    0.263    
Wald Sig.          
FETA +         
β  15.7840a 7.3781b 19.999b 17.1025b 15.8410a 7.4598b 20.1024a  
SE  2.3852 3.5178 7.9746 8.7496 2.3970 3.5242 7.9932  
dy/dx   3.490a 0.532c -19.336b -0.038 3.171a 0.540c 15.202a  
Wald Sig.   0.0500b 0.6424 0.9453     
IATA +         
β          
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SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
CFOTA -         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
CFOCL -         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
CFOS -         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
ECFO -         
β      -0.1009a -0.0928 -0.1869  
SE      0.0429 0.0751 0.1282  
dy/dx       -0.020c -0.0067 -0.141  
Wald Sig.          
CFOG -         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
FECFO +         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
Goodness of Fit         
Wald chi2  202.92a 73.11c 61.65b 76.45b 206.38a 73.91c 62.03b  
Log likelihood -1339.90 -592.310 -288.406 -340.618 -1337.25 -591.554 -287.360  
AUROC          
Within Sample 0.7578 0.7193 0.7943 0.8879 0.7579 0.7226 0.7945  
Out-of-sample 0.7065 0.5897 0.8091 0.7275 0.7169 0.5987 0.8224  
Number of Observations 40171 11237 8273 14944 40171 11237 8273  
Bankrupt 311 165 70 76 311 165 70  
Censored 39860 11072 8203 14868 39860 11072 8203  
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents multivariate regression results for the 
bankrupt group of firms for respective size categories with and without operating cash flow information. Here, ‘β’ is the regression 
coefficient, ‘SE’ is the standard error and ‘dy/dx’ (multiplied by 10,000) is the average marginal effect (AFE).  ‘Wald Sig.’ is the p-value 
obtained from the Wald test of equality of coefficients of significant covariates of SMEs with other groups (micro, small and medium 
firms) for respective significant covariates. The ‘Sign’ column reports the expected sign of the respective covariates in the regression 
analysis. The bottom part of this table reports goodness of fit measures and classification performance measures of respective 
multivariate models developed.    
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Table 5: Multivariate Hazard Models for Financially Distressed Firms 
Covariates Sign 
Without CFO Ratios With CFO Ratio 
SMEs Micro Small Medium SMEs Micro Small  Medium 
EBITDATA -         
β  -2.2485a -1.587a -2.5870a -5.6399a -1.9957a -1.6409a -2.6292a -5.7394a 
SE  0.0588 0.0870 0.1294 0.2186 0.0697 0.0876 0.1305 0.2207 
dy/dx   -13.323a -30.619a -20.226a -9.323a -11.334a -31.636a -19.521a -9.328a 
Wald Sig.   0.0000a 0.0171b 0.0000b     
STDEBV +         
β     0.6538a    0.6531a 
SE     0.0945    0.0946 
dy/dx [R]     1.080a    1.061a 
Wald Sig.          
CTA -         
β  -0.7884a -0.3738a -1.1278a -2.4368a -0.7966a -0.3787a -1.1218a -2.4184a 
SE  0.1034 0.1297 0.2367 0.2638 0.1031 0.1297 0.2370 0.2635 
dy/dx   -4.639a -7.212a -8.381a -4.028a -4.524a -7.301a -8.329a -3.930a 
Wald Sig.   0.0124b 0.1879 0.0000a     
RETA -         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
CETL -         
β  -0.6689a    -0.6860a    
SE  0.0213    0.0216    
dy/dx   -3.936a    -3.896a    
Wald Sig.          
TLTA +         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
CAG -         
β  -0.3922a -0.1685a -0.6643a -1.0562a -0.3717a -0.1636a -0.6596a -1.048a 
SE  0.0231 0.0300 0.0523 0.0688 0.0230 0.0301 0.0523 0.0688 
dy/dx [R]  -2.308a -3.251a -4.936a -1.746 -2.111a -3.154a -4.897a -1.704a 
Wald Sig.   0.0000a 0.0000a 0.0000a     
TTA -         
β  -16.012a -6.7385a -19.659a -14.727a -15.490a -6.7609a -19.518a -14.169a 
SE  1.1665 2.3129 2.6044 1.9925 1.1717 2.3107 2.600 1.9950 
dy/dx   -94.227a -130.01a 146.105a -24.346a -87.975a -130.03a -144.92a -23.028a 
Wald Sig.   0.0003a 0.2012      
LCR -         
β  -0.0662b -0.7920a -0.7630a  -0.1415a -0.7868a -0.7613a  
SE  0.0333 0.0395 0.0637  0.0347 0.0395 0.0637  
dy/dx   -0.390b -15.281a -5.670a  -0.803a -15.170a -5.652a  
Wald Sig.   0.0000a 0.0000a      
TCTA +         
β   0.4286c 1.2110a 2.0290a  0.3378c 1.1844a 1.9727a 
SE   0.2549 0.3989 0.4708  0.2554 0.3990 0.4714 
dy/dx    8.270c 9.000a 3.354a  6.513c 8.794a 3.206a 
Wald Sig.          
FETA +         
β  3.4678a 5.4674a 7.0595a 21.8413a 3.4341a 5.4749a 7.0160a 21.7840a 
SE  0.5001 0.6383 1.0545 1.2862 0.4981 0.6386 1.0547 1.2868 
dy/dx   20.407a 105.48a 52.465a 36.106a 19.503a 105.55a 52.093a 35.404a 
Wald Sig.   0.0137b 0.0021a 0.0000a     
IATA +         
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β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
CFOTA -         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
CFOCL -         
β      -0.1850a    
SE      0.0247    
dy/dx       -1.050a    
Wald Sig.          
CFOS -         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
ECFO -         
β         -0.0969a 
SE         0.0189 
dy/dx          -0.157a 
Wald Sig.          
CFOG -         
β      -0.0608a -0.0946a -0.0583a -0.0442a 
SE      0.0094 0.0155 0.0188 0.0183 
dy/dx       -0.345a -1.825a -4.328a -0.071a 
Wald Sig.       0.0313b 0.3710 0.1527 
FECFO +         
β          
SE          
dy/dx           
Wald Sig.          
Goodness of Fit         
Wald chi2  5152.95a 1811.69a 1222.76a 1408.23a 5134.59a 1832.63a 1226.34a 1411.44a 
Log likelihood -13638.3 -5671.45 -3825.34 -4462.15 -13594.7 -5652.85 -3820.51 -4445.62 
AUROC          
Within Sample 0.8873 0.8224 0.8613 0.8918 0.8873 0.8243 0.8619 0.8930 
Out-of-sample 0.8680 0.8403 0.8425 0.8276 0.8674 0.8416 0.8432 0.8278 
Number of Observations 40922 11995 10682 18207 40922 11995 10682 18207 
Financially Distressed 8836 4245 2283 2308 8836 4245 2283 2308 
Censored 32086 7750 8399 15899 32086 7750 8399 15899 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table presents multivariate regression results for the 
financially distressed group of firms for respective size categories with and without operating cash flow information. Here, ‘β’ is the 
regression coefficient, ‘SE’ is the standard error and ‘dy/dx’ (multiplied by 100) is the average marginal effect (AFE).  ‘Wald Sig.’ is the 
p-value obtained from the Wald test of equality of coefficients of significant covariates of SMEs with other groups (micro, small, and 
medium firms) for respective significant covariates. The ‘Sign’ column reports the expected sign of the respective covariates in the 
regression analysis. The bottom part of this table reports goodness of fit measures and classification performance measures of respective 
multivariate models developed.    
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Figure 1: Table of Survival and Hazard Curves 
 
Notes: These figures report survival and hazard curves for bankrupt and financially distressed groups of firms.    
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Appendix 
 
Descriptive Statistics on Failure Rate Across SMEs Size Categories 
 
Information on the sample for the dependent variables, disaggregated by SMEs size classification and 
failure (bankrupt and financially distressed firms), is presented in Table A1. For each default 
classification the values for all SMEs are presented, followed by values for micro, small, and medium 
firms. Each column contains three figures. The first, “D”, is the number of firms experiencing a default 
event in the year/category concerned. The second, “C”, is the number of censored (relevant non-
default) observations and %D is calculated as D/(D+C) ×100.  
 Turning to the columns headed “SME”, note that the incidence of financial distress is much 
greater than bankruptcy. There is an apparent decline in incidence from the start of the sample period, 
especially from around 2001. This is also the case in terms of the percentage of firms that are filing 
for bankruptcy, falling from 1.39% in 1990 to less than 0.5% in 2007. In contrast, occurrences of 
financial distress have been rather more stable or increased over time. The largest number of distress 
events was in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, although a relatively large increase is also observed in 
2009. The former may coincide with the end of the dotcom boom and the latter, with the more recent 
financial crisis, 2009 being a year that the US experienced negative GDP growth. The percentage of 
SMEs under financial distress has also generally increased over the sample period, from 19% in 1990 
to over 30% in 2014. This percentage has not fallen significantly from the peak in 2009 as the 
replacement rate has clearly not been sufficient to counter the large proportion of filings that are 
observed. 
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are presented in Table A1, disaggregated by 
firms filing for bankruptcy and in financial distress. Section A of Table A1 reports on firms filing for 
bankruptcy, with columns “C” representing the censored group of firms and “D” representing the 
group that experienced the default event (bankruptcy or financial distress). With the exception of Micro 
firms, the earnings (EBITDATA) of SMEs that filed for bankruptcy are worse than for non-filing firms, 
as might be expected. Cash and short-term investments (CTA) are lower for all classes of filing firms. 
The same is also true for capital growth (CAG) which is negative for all classes of filing firms, in 
contrast the non-filing.  Bankruptcy filing firms also have lower levels of intangible assets relative to 
total assets (IATA). Overall, cash flow relative to assets (COFTA) is worse for bankrupt firms but this 
47 | P a g e  
 
is not a consistent finding across size classes. A similar finding is observed when the denominator is 
sale (CFOS). Earnings relative to cash-flow (ECFO) is worse for all classes of filing firms. Cash-flow 
growth (CFOG) is also worse overall for the bankrupt firms, although perhaps surprisingly this is not 
consistent across groups. Interpretation of the financial expenses variable is more difficult given that 
a number of cash-flows are negative. 
Section B of Table A1 presents basic statistics on variables for financially distressed firms, where 
the larger sample size facilitates interpretation. Earnings (EBITDATA) are worse for all classes of 
financially distressed firms. On average short-term debt relative to equity book value (STDEBV) is 
also lower (although the finding is not consistent). Cash holdings are consistently lower for distressed 
firms, as are retained earnings, presumably reflecting the greater difficulty that such firms are facing 
in servicing their financial commitments. Capital employed relative to total liabilities (CETL) is also 
lower for financially distressed firms. The finding for capital growth is the same as for filing firms, 
negative for all classes of financially distressed firms. For all but medium sized firms, current assets 
are lower than current liabilities, with a negative log of the ratio in contrast to firms that are not 
distressed. This might be expected, but the contrast suggests that this variable might be particularly 
important in predicting default. Trade credit relative to total assets is also larger for all classes of 
distressed firm. Financial expenses (FETA) are more than twice as large for distressed firms, although 
the standard deviation is understandably quite large for values that cut across many different years and 
types of firm. A finding more consistent with the literature than was the case for bankruptcy is that 
intangible assets (IATA) are greater for the distressed as opposed to non-distressed firms. Descriptive 
statistics on cash-flow measures are generally consistent. With only two exceptions, cash-flow relative 
to assets, liabilities and sales (CFOTA, CFOCL and CFOS) are worse for distressed firms. The 
exceptions are micro firms where cash-flows are measured relative to liabilities and sales. This 
therefore suggests the value in considering these ratios in the prediction of default. Further evidence 
is presented on this matter when considering earnings relative to cash-flow (ECFO), which are higher 
for distressed firms, except the medium size category. This suggests that distressed firms are less able 
to convert earnings to cash-flow. Cash-flow growth (CFOG) is also lower for financially distressed 
firms, as are financial expenses relative to cash-flow (FECFO). 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Covariates 
Section A: Bankrupt Firms 
SME Micro Small Medium 
C D C D C D C D 
EBITDATA         
Mean -0.2049 -0.3084 -0.5560 -0.4539 -0.1706 -0.1899 0.0042 -0.1017 
Median  -0.0510 -0.1327 -0.5176 -0.3435 -0.0641 -0.0806 0.0603 0.0028 
SD 0.4130 0.4334 0.4456 0.4625 0.3577 0.3757 0.2288 0.2754 
STDEBV         
Mean 0.1034 0.0437 0.0058 -0.0267 0.1231 0.1114 0.1557 0.1345 
Median  0.0087 0 0 0 0.0147 0.0033 0.0307 0 
SD 0.3441 0.4341 0.3372 0.3313 0.3586 0.4878 0.3261 0.5442 
CTA         
Mean 0.2655 0.2198 0.3418 0.2976 0.2585 0.1469 0.2199 0.1183 
Median  0.1613 0.0709 0.2535 0.1557 0.1612 0.0446 0.1320 0.0470 
SD 0.2599 0.2669 0.2990 0.2987 0.2493 0.2094 0.2247 0.1740 
RETA         
Mean -2.5666 -4.2548 -5.3681 -6.1627 -2.3369 2.4005 -.8716 -1.8208 
Median  -0.8798 -2.164 -4.6119 -7.3364 -1.0274 -1.2817 -0.1625 -0.8284 
SD 3.5758 4.1384 4.0742 4.1326 3.1649 2.8172 1.9722 2.9872 
CETL         
Mean 2.6031 1.3570 2.7868 1.8086 2.5931 1.0003 2.4890 0.7053 
Median  1.5743 .4508 1.2492 0.3450 1.5665 0.5401 1.6827 0.4856 
SD 2.6965 2.4149 3.2746 3.0640 2.6559 1.3180 2.2605 0.9892 
TLTA         
Mean 0.5931 1.0194 0.7652 1.0524 0.5719 0.9310 0.4932 1.0293 
Median  0.4495 0.9699 0.5188 1.2092 0.4497 0.8277 0.4308 0.9131 
SD 0.4824 0.5710 0.6381 0.6355 0.4496 0.5167 0.3274 0.4572 
CAG         
Mean 0.1857 -0.1508 0.1199 -0.1213 0.1728 -0.2106 0.2363 -0.1599 
Median  0.0169 -0.2920 -0.0944 -0.3687 0.0044 -0.2432 0.0555 -0.2486 
SD 0.7936 0.7379 0.9111 0.8449 0.7888 0.5433 0.7058 0.6424 
TTA         
Mean 0.0077 0.0035 0.0012 0.0028 0.0062 0.0059 0.0128 0.0031 
Median  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0012 0 
SD 0.0231 0.0199 0.0129 0.0173 0.0218 0.0239 0.0274 0.0211 
LCR         
Mean 0.5916 0.0219 0.2854 0.0759 0.6510 -0.0362 0.7568 -0.0416 
Median  0.6488 -0.1028 0.1666 -0.2232 0.6644 0.0249 0.7585 -0.0693 
SD 1.0465 1.1119 1.3243 1.2963 0.9890 0.9503 0.8020 0.7687 
TCTA         
Mean 0.1211 0.1648 0.1573 0.1830 0.1162 0.1360 0.1003 0.1517 
Median  0.0766 0.1044 0.0879 0.1124 0.0775 0.0747 0.0730 0.1320 
SD 0.1177 0.1481 0.1514 0.1651 0.1090 0.1273 0.0882 0.1204 
FETA         
Mean 0.0312 0.0586 0.0433 0.0558 0.0319 0.0611 0.0230 0.0625 
Median  0.0139 0.0468 0.0156 0.0327 0.0163 0.0532 0.0123 0.0507 
SD 0.0398 0.0513 0.0508 0.0555 0.0385 0.0471 0.0289 0.0453 
IATA         
Mean 0.0749 0.0468 0.0618 0.0294 0.0667 0.065 0.0882 0.0669 
Median  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0133 0.0033 
SD 0.1350 0.1133 0.1362 0.0981 0.1274 0.1339 0.1373 0.1189 
CFOTA         
Mean -0.1777 -0.2412 -0.4535 -0.3654 -0.1466 -0.1251 -0.0158 -0.0786 
Median  -0.0449 -0.0723 -0.3703 -0.2186 -0.0544 -0.0296 0.0264 -0.0237 
SD 0.3633 0.4089 0.4271 0.4591 0.3170 0.3319 0.2028 0.2359 
CFOCL         
Mean -0.5031 -0.4221 -1.3040 -0.6389 -0.4990 -0.2382 0.0174 -0.1208 
Median  -0.1203 -0.1076 -0.8409 -0.1991 -0.1540 -0.0371 0.0910 -0.0519 
SD 1.3030 1.1656 1.4574 1.4102 1.2603 0.9052 0.8909 0.5345 
CFOS         
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Mean -10.6050 -15.1467 -33.3286 -27.6337 -2.2182 -2.0802 -0.6751 -0.0718 
Median  -0.0492 -0.0894 -3.6520 -0.6408 -0.0555 -0.0205 0.0221 -0.0130 
SD 28.749 34.6362 43.6190 43.2090 11.7680 12.4812 7.0432 0.3036 
ECFO         
Mean 1.1013 0.8596 1.3699 1.0054 1.0099 0.6738 0.9794 0.7143 
Median  1.0732 0.7621 1.1708 0.8612 1.0145 0.7684 1.0105 0.5383 
SD 1.8143 1.9500 1.7200 1.8848 1.7601 1.8834 1.8859 2.1412 
CFOG         
Mean -0.1176 -0.2539 0.0956 -0.1598 -0.1837 -0.13561 -0.2182 -0.5673 
Median  -0.1806 -0.5192 -0.0590 -0.475 -0.2261 -0.4918 -0.2567 -0.7161 
SD 1.9075 2.0441 1.7678 2.0072 1.9329 2.2120 1.9684 1.9561 
FECFO         
Mean -0.0017 -0.0180 -0.11580 -0.09690 0.0044 0.1188 0.0691 0.0270 
Median  -0.00002 -0.0077 -0.0158 -0.0035 -0.0021 -0.0005 0.0012 -0.0616 
SD 0.5514 0.74830 0.4763 0.5982 0.5695 0.8082 0.5736 0.9475 
 Section B: Financially Distressed Firms 
EBITDATA         
Mean -0.1139 -0.5392 -0.4370 -0.7699 -0.1025 -0.4221 0.0378 -0.2308 
Median  0.0128 -0.4500 -0.3327 -1.0766 -0.0069 -0.3085 0.0799 -0.1394 
SD 0.3568 0.4323 0.4287 0.3936 0.3185 0.3818 0.1984 0.2827 
STDEBV         
Mean 0.1175 0.0502 0.0453 -0.0676 0.1294 0.0995 0.1465 0.2184 
Median  0.0132 0 0 -0.0509 0.0172 0 0.0286 0.0693 
SD 0.3003 0.4690 0.2784 0.4142 0.3160 0.4867 0.2963 0.4857 
CTA         
Mean 0.2789 0.2153 0.3902 0.2515 0.2785 0.1815 0.2248 0.1821 
Median  0.1816 0.1005 0.3867 0.1224 0.1907 0.0877 0.1393 0.0856 
SD 0.2620 0.2462 0.3019 0.2719 0.2539 0.2145 0.2256 0.2145 
RETA         
Mean -1.8372 -5.2749 -4.2463 -7.4520 -1.8051 -4.2977 -0.6780 -2.2373 
Median  -0.5192 -4.4052 -2.6929 -10.1678 -0.7138 -3.0994 -0.0869 -1.2023 
SD 3.0510 4.0500 3.8988 3.5433 2.7827 3.6660 1.7555 2.7439 
CETL         
Mean 3.1292 0.6487 3.9980 0.5322 3.0841 0.7359 2.7289 0.7768 
Median  2.1091 0.3408 3.1116 -0.1069 2.0553 0.5055 1.9267 0.7099 
SD 2.7523 1.1598 3.3638 1.3621 2.7292 1.0859 2.2995 0.7233 
TLTA         
Mean 0.4626 1.0819 0.5035 1.2553 0.4629 0.9843 0.4425 0.8598 
Median  0.3587 0.9835 0.2601 1.6921 0.3651 0.8567 0.3878 0.7610 
SD 0.3802 0.5117 0.5287 0.5277 0.3710 0.4815 0.2849 0.3837 
CAG         
Mean 1.0819 -0.1025 0.1867 -0.0115 0.2660 -0.1822 0.2964 -0.1911 
Median  0.9835 -0.2842 -0.0502 -0.2899 0.0537 -0.3204 0.0830 -0.2521 
SD 0.5117 0.7667 0.9144 0.8897 0.7887 0.6775 0.7039 0.5578 
TTA         
Mean 0.0097 0.0003 0.0018 0.0003 0.0079 1.95e-06 0.0146 0.0006 
Median  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0027 0 
SD 0.0247 0.0133 0.0141 0.0105 0.0235 0.0119 0.0281 0.0182 
LCR         
Mean 0.8150 -0.2397 0.7414 -0.5573 0.8405 -0.0682 0.8374 0.1747 
Median  0.8665 -0.2988 1.008 -1.1981 0.8665 -0.0601 0.8438 0.1779 
SD 0.9610 0.9289 1.2780 0.9393 0.9364 0.8448 0.7735 0.7671 
TCTA         
Mean 0.0991 0.2026 0.1113 0.2424 0.0983 0.1828 0.0935 0.1488 
Median  0.0649 0.1663 0.0512 0.2657 0.0659 0.1483 0.0691 0.1180 
SD 0.0985 0.1444 0.1284 0.1542 0.0951 0.1300 0.0815 0.1147 
FETA         
Mean 0.0234 0.0607 0.0287 0.0704 0.0253 0.0570 0.0197 0.0465 
Median  0.0098 0.0482 0.0055 0.0720 0.0120 0.0447 0.0105 0.0356 
SD 0.0328 0.0491 0.0432 0.0530 0.0333 0.0459 0.0254 0.0401 
IATA         
Mean 0.0731 0.0803 0.0563 0.0707 0.0626 0.0819 0.0869 0.0964 
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Median  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0129 0.0166 
SD 0.1322 0.1441 0.1303 0.1449 0.1231 0.1413 0.1362 0.1441 
CFOTA         
Mean -0.1118 -0.4190 -0.3639 -0.6140 -0.1017 -0.3114 0.0058 -0.1669 
Median  -0.0096 -0.2868 -0.2605 -0.7710 -0.0232 -0.1899 0.0391 -0.0898 
SD 0.3132 0.4274 0.3988 0.4315 0.2843 0.3724 0.1805 0.2735 
CFOCL         
Mean -0.4337 -0.7523 -1.4773 -0.9611 -0.4480 -0.6792 0.0832 -0.4407 
Median  -0.0343 -0.3290 -1.3033 0.4573 -0.0816 -0.3025 0.1498 -0.1885 
SD 1.3534 1.0583 1.5681 1.1622 1.3168 0.9941 0.8822 0.8026 
CFOS         
Mean -9.0921 -16.2593 -34.0816 -31.7291 -2.0840 -2.7081 -0.5946 -1.2109 
Median  -0.0105 -0.40788 -3.9621 -3.0557 -0.0253 -0.1756 0.0331 -0.0760 
SD 26.9017 34.2552 43.8976 43.0612 11.4163 12.9902 6.8406 8.1899 
ECFO         
Mean 1.0666 1.2190 1.2568 1.5628 0.9922 1.0647 1.0130 0.7393 
Median  1.0617 1.1113 1.1259 1.2824 1.0112 1.0189 1.0364 0.8051 
SD 1.7882 1.9066 1.6158 1.8873 1.7362 1.8487 1.8863 1.8755 
CFOG         
Mean -0.10333 -0.1746 0.1606 -0.0333 -0.1628 -0.2591 -0.2007 -0.3506 
Median  -0.1530 -0.2733 0.0133 -0.1940 -0.1930 -0.3447 -0.2373 -0.4238 
SD 1.9529 1.737 1.8537 1.6027 1.9674 1.8075 1.9807 1.8768 
FECFO         
Mean 0.0368 -0.1426 -0.0708 -0.1972 0.0354 -0.1061 0.0902 -0.0782 
Median  -1.35e-07 -0.0893 -0.0030 -0.0892 -5.94e-07 -0.1000 0.0072 -0.0828 
SD 0.5141 0.6573 0.4086 0.5756 0.5273 0.6997 0.5441 0.7417 
Notes: This table reports mean, median and standard deviation (SD) of respective covariates for SMEs, micro, small and medium firms. 
Here, ‘D’ represents firms which have experienced the event of interest and ‘C’ represents the censored group of firms. Section A reports 
the details for our sample of bankrupt firms, while section B reports details of the financially distressed group of firms.   
 
Sample Industrial Classification 
 
Table A2: Sample Industrial Classification 
Industry Code SIC Code Industry 
1 < 1000 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
2 1000 to < 1500 Mining 
3 1500 to < 1800 Construction 
4 2000 to < 4000 Manufacturing 
5 5000 to < 5200 Wholesale Trade 
6 5200 to < 6000 Retail Trade 
7 7000 to < 8900 Services 
Notes: This table reports Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of US firms. SIC Code is a four-digit code that represents a given 
industrial sectors.  
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Area Under ROC Curves 
 
Figure A1: Table of Area under ROC curves for Bankrupt Firms 
 
Notes: These figures report area under ROC curves for respective multivariate hazard models developed for bankrupt firms.    
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Figure A2: Table of Area under ROC curves for Financially Distressed Firms 
 
Notes: These figures report area under ROC curves for respective multivariate hazard models developed for financially distressed firms.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
